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Catholic Dioceses in Bankruptcy
Marie T. Reilly†
The Catholic Church is coping with mass tort liability for sexual abuse
of children by priests. As of September 2018, eighteen Catholic
organizations have filed for relief in bankruptcy. Fifteen debtors have
emerged from bankruptcy after settling with sexual abuse claimants and
insurers. During settlement negotiations, sexual abuse claimants and
debtors clashed over the extent of the debtors’ property and ability to pay
claims. Although such disputes are common in Chapter 11 plan
negotiations, the Catholic cases required the parties and bankruptcy courts
to account for the unique religious attributes of Catholic diocesan debtors.
This Article reviews the arguments and outcomes on these issues based on
reported decisions, pleadings, plans, and disclosure statements. It explains
the key characteristics of Catholic dioceses under canon and secular
organization law and the bankruptcy contexts in which these characteristics
became hot-button issues. It offers an analysis of the legacy of the Catholic
cases for bankruptcy law, religious liberty, and for the relationships among
entities within a Catholic diocese.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2002, the Boston Globe reported that a former priest of the
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, John J. Geoghan, had been accused
by more than 130 people of sexually abusing children since the mid-1990s.1
Boston Archbishop Cardinal Bernard Law and five other bishops knew of
credible accusations against Geoghan, but did nothing to warn the faithful or
bar Geoghan from unsupervised access to children.2 Six months after the
story broke, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB)
acknowledged responsibility for failure to protect children from clergy

1

See Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priests for Years, BOS. GLOBE (Jan.
6, 2002), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/church-allowedabuse-priest-for-years/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html; see also Key Stories from
the Boston Globe Spotlight Team Reporting on Clergy Abuse in the Catholic Church, BOS.
GLOBE (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2015/11/10/timeline-spotlight-reportstories/SGm67HGOQ7PolOSGZHxs8K/story.html. The Boston Globe investigative series
won the 2003 Pulitzer Prize for Public Service. See The Boston Globe, PULITZER PRIZES,
http://www.pulitzer.org/winners/boston-globe-1 (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). The series
became the basis of the 2015 film “Spotlight.” See generally SPOTLIGHT (Open Road Films
2015).
2
See DAVID FRANCE, OUR FATHERS: THE SECRET LIFE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AN
AGE OF SCANDAL 129–48 (2004). In 2002, Geoghan was convicted and “sentenced to nine to
[ten] years in prison” for indecent assault and battery against a ten-year-old boy that occurred
in 1991.
Sex Abuse Priest Killed in Prison, CNN (Feb. 23, 2004),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/08/24/geoghan/index.html. He was killed in prison by a fellow
inmate in 2004. Id.
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sexual abuse.3 As it turned out, the problem was not limited to the
Archdiocese of Boston.
In July 2004, after efforts to settle multiple sexual abuse claims
collapsed, the Archdiocese of Portland, Oregon became the first Catholic
organization to seek bankruptcy protection.4 Elizabeth Warren (then a law
professor) expressed surprise that a Catholic archbishop would be willing to
undergo the loss of privacy and control required of debtors in bankruptcy.5
In retrospect, however, the resort to bankruptcy by the Archdiocese of
Portland and the seventeen Catholic dioceses and religious institutes that
have followed it into bankruptcy is not surprising. Sexual abuse of children
3

See, e.g., U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE 1 (2002), http://www.bishop-accountability.org/resources/res
ource-files/churchdocs/DallasCharter.pdf (“[T]he ways in which we bishops addressed these
crimes and sins, have caused enormous pain, anger, and confusion.”); see also Raymond C.
O’Brien, Clergy, Sex and the American Way, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 363, 365–66 (2004) (“It
appeared as if the Church had isolated itself from the state’s concern for children, an isolation
which appeared arrogant and even sinister.”); Associated Press, Scandals in the Church:
Statement by President of the U.S. Catholic Bishops on Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (June 14,
2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/14/us/scandals-church-statement-president-uscatholic-bishops-sexual-abuse.html (“We did not go far enough to ensure that every child and
minor was safe from sexual abuse. . . . Both what we have done or what we have failed to do
contributed to the sexual abuse of children and young people by clergy and church
personnel.”).
4
See Doe 130 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Or., 717 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130 (D. Or.
2010). The Archdiocese of Portland filed for bankruptcy on the eve of jury selection in a civil
sexual abuse trial involving its alleged negligent supervision of a priest who was accused of
abusing more than fifty boys between 1950 and 1980. See Laurie Goodstein, Oregon
Archdiocese Files for Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/07/us/oregon-archdiocese-files-for-bankruptcy-protection.
html. Four years earlier, the Archbishop of Portland, John Vlazny, had publicly apologized
for the sexual abuse of children by the Archdiocese’s priests. See Doe 130, 717 F. Supp. 2d
at 1129–30. In the year before bankruptcy, the Archdiocese paid more than $21 million to
settle sexual abuse claims. See Letter from John G. Vlazny, Archbishop of Portland,
Archdiocese of Portland in Or., to Brothers and Sisters in Christ (July 6, 2004),
http://www.bishop-accountability.org/ia-davenport/bankruptcy/2004-07-06-Vlazny-Letter.ht
m; see also Goodstein, supra.
5
See Michael Paulson, Archdiocese Files for Bankruptcy, SUN-SENTINEL (July 7, 2004),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2004-07-07/news/0407070083_1_diocese-bankruptcy-court;
see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Avoiding Moral Bankruptcy, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1181, 1181 (2003)
(noting that rumors that the Archdiocese of Boston might file for bankruptcy took him by
surprise); Pam Belluck & Adam Liptak, For Boston Archdiocese, Bankruptcy Would Have
Drawbacks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/03/us/for-bostonarchdiocese-bankruptcy-would-have-drawbacks.html (quoting bankruptcy scholar Jay
Westbrook that “[f]or the Archdiocese of Boston to [file for bankruptcy] would be stunning”).
A bankruptcy filing requires the debtor to open its books to creditors, the courts, and the
public, and to be subject to court supervision and public scrutiny of its financial affairs and
business operations. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 341, 343 (2018) (allowing creditors to question
the debtor under oath, and challenge the accuracy and completeness of the debtor’s
disclosure); id. § 1112(b)(1), (4)(G) (stating that failure to comply is grounds for dismissal of
the case).
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by priests had become a mass tort problem for Catholic organizations, and
Chapter 11 was the obvious legal response.6
The Catholic bankruptcy cases put a legal spotlight on the secular and
ecclesiastical relationships between a diocesan debtor and the parishes,
schools, cemeteries, and other entities that operate within the diocese and
under the bishop’s authority. Although fights about the nature and value of
a debtor’s property are common in Chapter 11 cases, Catholic dioceses are
not ordinary debtors. Skirmishes between sexual abuse creditors and the
debtors were unusually aggressive and public. Advocates for sexual abuse
claimants stoked the media with plans “to go after . . . parish assets.”7 One
attorney described the push to include parish assets as a “‘slugfest’ [that]
must occur ‘before people get serious’ about settlement.”8 The Catholic
debtors pushed back, seeking protection from bankruptcy court-adjudication
of property of the estate on religious freedom grounds. They also argued
that the property rights subject to their bankruptcy cases did not include
property that they attributed to parishes and other diocesan affiliates under
secular and religious law.

6
By 2004, reorganization in bankruptcy was a common corporate response to mass tort
liability. See Susan Chandler, Oregon Archdiocese Takes a Page from Corporate Playbook,
CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 1, 2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-08-01/business/04080100
31_1_portland-archdiocese-portland-archbishop-john-vlazny-bankruptcy-judge-elizabeth-pe
rris (analogizing sex abuse claims to asbestos claims); see also Francis E. McGovern, The
Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1754 (2002) (noting that bankruptcy
is the only way an asbestos defendant could achieve complete and final disposition of claims);
Georgene Vairo, Mass Tort Bankruptcies: The Who, the Why and the How, 78 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 93, 95 (2004) (noting that use of bankruptcy by companies with asbestos liability had
become “routine,” and predicting use of bankruptcy as response to non-asbestos mass tort
issues).
7
Annysa Johnson, Parishes’ Assets Targeted in Archdiocese Bankruptcy Case,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Oct. 18, 2012), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/religion/parishesassets-targeted-in-archdiocese-bankruptcy-case-tf79a59-174875991.html (“Lawyers for
sexual abuse victims . . . telegraphed [that] they intend to go after individual parish assets and
proceeds from the Archdiocese’s $105 million Faith in Our Future campaign.”); see also
Attorneys Want Diocese to Claim Ownership, SIOUX CITY J. (Oct. 25, 2006),
http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/attorneys-want-diocese-to-claim-owner
ship/article_9b3d7893-3846-5949-8a5b-859e80ece7dd.html (reporting that lawyers for
sexual abuse claimants said that separately incorporated parishes should contribute their
property to pay claims, and that they “believe the bishop controls the parishes”); Goodstein,
supra note 4.
8
E.g., Donald L. Swanson, Don’t Let This Happen to You: Milwaukee Archdiocese
Bankruptcy - Part Three: The In-Court “Slugfest,” MEDIATBANKRY (May 5, 2016),
https://mediatbankry.com/2016/05/05/dont-let-this-happen-to-you-milwaukee-archdiocesebankruptcy-part-three-the-in-court-slugfest/; see also Listecki v. Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee), 496 B.R. 905, 912 (E.D. Wis. 2013)
(noting that decision regarding the fate of the Cemetery Trust litigation “will shape the course
of future proceedings in bankruptcy”), rev’d, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015).
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As of September 2018, of the eighteen organizations that filed for
bankruptcy protection, fifteen (seven dioceses, six archdioceses, and two
religious institutes) have emerged from bankruptcy after confirming
consensual plans.9 The Archdiocese of San Diego settled with its creditors
and dismissed its Chapter 11 case about six months after filing.10
This Article considers the arguments and outcomes on property issues
in the Catholic bankruptcy cases. Part II explains the unique legal
characteristics of Catholic dioceses as debtors in bankruptcy under canon
law and secular organizational law. Part III explains the conflicts between
advocates for sexual abuse creditors and the debtors over the nature and
extent of the debtors’ property. Part IV considers the contexts and outcomes
of litigation about the debtors’ right to religious liberty under the First
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Part V
looks briefly at the issues that arose in the battle of competing plans in the
Saint Paul and Minneapolis case. Part VI reflects on the effects of the
Catholic diocesan bankruptcy cases on bankruptcy law, religious liberty, and
the relationships among bishops, dioceses, parishes and other entities within
the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.
II. CATHOLIC DIOCESES AS DEBTORS
A. Canon Law
Bankruptcy cases of non-profit religious organizations are not
unusual.11 The Catholic diocesan debtors, however, are unique among nonprofit organizations in bankruptcy because of their affiliation with the
Catholic Church. The Church is a worldwide community established over
two thousand years ago by Jesus Christ with about 1.25 billion members who
hold a common religious creed.12 The 1983 Code of Canon Law (“canon
9
See Marie T. Reilly & Rebecca A. Mattson, Catholic Dioceses in Bankruptcy, PENN
STATE LAW ELIBRARY, https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/bankruptcy/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019)
(archive of plans, disclosure statements, and other selected documents collected from public
dockets in the Catholic bankruptcy cases).
10
Id.
11
See Pamela Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 277 (2014);
Pamela Foohey, When Faith Falls Short: Bankruptcy Decisions of Churches, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
1319 (2015).
12
See U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 862 (2d
ed. 2000); The Pontifical Yearbook 2017 and the “Annuarium Statiscum Ecclesiae” 2015,
HOLY SEE PRESS OFF. BULL. (June 4, 2017), http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/boll
ettino/pubblico/2017/04/06/170406e.html; Michael Lipka, A Closer Look at Catholic
America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/09/14/a-closer-look-at-catholic-america/ (about twenty percent of adults residing
in the United States report that their primary religious affiliation is Roman Catholic); Cindy
Wooden, Global Catholic Population Tops 1.28 Billion; Half Are in 10 Countries, NAT’L
CATH. REP. (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/global-catholic-
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law”) governs the conduct of all Catholics.13 It establishes the internal
organizational structure and procedures of the Catholic Church and the
property rights and agency relationships of entities within the Church.14
Canon law describes the Catholic Church as a complete community.15
Yet, the Church operates within a distinct secular community, which is
subject to secular law. Canon law acknowledges secular law and requires
that Catholics must comply with it, except for secular laws that are contrary
to divine law16 or when canon law expressly supersedes it.17 For example,
canon law expressly supersedes civil law on the right of the Church to preach
the Gospel and to “announce moral principles, even about the social
order . . . .”18 Conversely, canon law adopts secular law on certain matters,
including general and specific regulations on contracts and payments subject
to divine law or conflicting canon law.19 As to most of the matters that
secular law regulates, however, canon law is silent.20 In particular, canon
law has nothing to say about the rights of creditors of Catholic organizations
against the organizations or their property.
The Catholic Church is not a universal, monolithic corporate
organization. Nor is it a Pope-led kingdom with absolute, downward
hierarchy, as many suppose. The Church operates through a central leader,
the Pope, and through its “particular churches,” regional entities including

population-tops-128-billion-half-are-10-countries.
13
See generally 1983 CODE C.11 (ecclesiastical law binding on all baptized Catholics
over seven years of age). Catholics are also bound by divine law, revealed in scripture or
tradition. Id. C.750. Catholics who follow the Eastern Rite follow the 1990 Code of Canons
of the Eastern Churches. See generally CODE OF CANONS OF THE EASTERN CHURCHES (1990),
https://orthocath.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/1990_code_of_canons_of_the_eastern_churc
hes.pdf.
14
See 1983 CODE C.96–144; id. C.330-572; id. C.1259–1310.
15
See Jacques Maritain, The Catholic Church and Social Progress, FOREIGN AFF. (July
1, 1939), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1939-07-01/catholic-church-and-socialprogress.
16
Divine law, also known as natural law, is law enacted by God and made known to man
through revelation. See generally JEAN PORTER, NATURAL AND DIVINE LAW: RECLAIMING THE
TRADITION FOR CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1999); Moral Aspect of Divine Law, NEW ADVENT,
www.newadvent.org/cathen/09071a.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
17
See 1983 CODE C.22.
18
See, e.g., id. C.747, § 1 (“The Church . . . has the duty and innate right, independent of
any human power whatsoever, to preach the gospel to all peoples.”).
19
See id. C.1290. The Catechism of the Catholic Church provides that Catholics are
morally bound to observe legitimate secular laws but must disobey laws that are “contrary to
the demands of the moral order, to the fundamental rights of persons or the teachings of the
Gospel.” U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 541 c.2242
(2d ed. 2016); see also NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW 84 (John P. Beal et
al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW].
20
NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 85.
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archdioceses, dioceses, parishes, and religious institutes.21 Dioceses are
geographic areas.22 An archdiocese is a large diocese23 in terms of the
numbers of Catholics residing within it, and usually covers a large
metropolitan area.24 Residing and operating within the geographic
boundaries of a diocese are communities of Catholic faithful known as
parishes.25 Religious institutes are groups of individuals (e.g., priests, nuns,
brothers) who undertake certain vows and agree to live in community with
other members under a common order or tradition.26 A religious institute
operates independently of a diocese, however, on religious matters,
individual members are subject to the authority of the bishop of the diocese
in which they reside.27
Canon law recognizes corporate agency for entities distinct from the
persons who comprise them.28 Indeed, corporate agency as a legal construct
may have originated in early Roman Catholic canon law.29 Canon law calls
21
See 1983 CODE C.368–430. The most common form of a particular church is a diocese.
NEW COMMENTARY ON CANNON LAW, supra note 19, at 506.
22
See 1983 CODE C.369 (a diocese is “a portion of the people of God which is entrusted
[for pastoral care] to a bishop . . .”); see also Diocese and Bishop Addresses, U.S. CONF. OF
CATH. BISHOPS, www.usccb.org/about/bishops-and-dioceses/all-dioceses.cfm (last visited
March 1, 2019) (listing of archdioceses and dioceses in the U.S.)
23
Hereafter, unless the context indicates, “diocese” refers to archdiocese or diocese.
24
An archdiocese may also be referred to as a “metropolitan see.” A “see” is an
ecclesiastical province that includes the archdiocese and “suffrage” dioceses within the
ecclesiastical province that are also under the authority of the archbishop. See 1983 CODE
C.431, § 1, C.435, C.436. An archbishop has authority over his own diocese and as the head
of the metropolitan see has certain responsibilities to the suffrage dioceses within the see. See
id. C.473, §1. For example, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York is the metropolitan
see of the ecclesiastical province of New York which includes the suffragan dioceses of
Albany, Brooklyn, Buffalo, Ogdensburg, Rochester, Rockville Centre and Syracuse. See
Ecclesiastical Province, Catholic Dioceses in United States of America, GCATHOLIC.ORG,
http://www.gcatholic.org/dioceses/country/US-province.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
Each diocese is a “particular church” within the “universal church.” 1983 CODE C.368; see
also JOHN J. COUGHLIN, CANON LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL THEORY 118 (2011). Along with dioceses, juridic entities such as territorial prelatures,
abbacies, apostolic vicarates, and prefactures are also “particular churches.” 1983 CODE
C.368; see also HENRI DE LUBAC, Particular Churches in the Universal Church, in THE
MOTHERHOOD OF THE CHURCH 191–211 (Sergia Englund trans., 1983).
25
See 1983 CODE C.515, § 1 (“A parish is a certain community of the Christian faithful
stably constituted in a particular church”); id. C.374, § 1 (“Every diocese . . . is . . . divided
into parishes”).
26
See id. C.607, § 2. See generally Sister Cecilia Meighan, Religious Institutes—
Property and Tax Issues, 33 CATH. LAW. 25 (1990). Some religious institutes are authorized
by the pope (known as “pontifical right” institutes), and are thus under the authority of the
pope rather than the bishop of the geographic diocese in which the institute is located. Id. at
25–26.
27
See 1983 CODE C.678, § 1; see also id. C.680 (providing for cooperation among
institutes and between institute and diocesan clergy under the direction of the bishop).
28
See NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 154–55.
29
See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE
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entities with such agency “juridic persons.”30 Dioceses, and diocesanaffiliated entities such as parishes, schools, cemeteries, special purpose trusts
are all public juridic persons with distinct agency under canon law.31
With respect to property rights, canon law recognizes a distinction
between ecclesiastical property (the Church’s property) and nonecclesiastical property. “[O]wnership of goods belongs to that juridic person
which has acquired them legitimately.”32 All property legitimately acquired
by a public juridic person is ecclesiastical property, whereas property
acquired by individual persons is not.33 For example, a monetary
contribution by an individual to his or her parish becomes ecclesiastical
property once the parish, as juridic person, acquires it.34 Property that
belongs to one juridic person cannot simultaneously belong to another juridic
person.35
A juridic person’s “ownership” of property is limited by canon law,
which establishes a hierarchy of authority among juridic persons. The
authority of juridic persons within the Church is generally, but not perfectly,
L.J. 655, 665 (1926) (attributing the legal concept of persona ficta to Pope Innocent IV who
used it to afford monasteries continuous and separate existence from the monks).
30
See 1983 CODE C.113, § 2 (“[B]esides physical persons, there are also juridic persons,
that is, subjects in canon law of obligations and rights which correspond to their nature.”).
Juridic persons have the “innate right . . . to acquire, retain, administer and alienate temporal
goods independently of civil power.” Id. C.1254, § 1. In contrast to a juridic person, a “moral
person” is a group of individuals, or assets, with a common purpose but without a canonical
legal personae distinct from the persons who comprise it. See NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON
LAW, supra note 19, at 154–55; see also 1983 CODE C.310 (A private association not
established as a juridic person has no agency of its own, but individual members of the
association can “jointly contract obligations and can acquire and possess rights and goods as
co-owners and co-possessors”). Goods held jointly by a private association are not
“ecclesiastical goods” and are not subject to canonical norms regulating such goods. See 1983
CODE C.1257; id. C.515, § 3 (stating the same as to parishes); id. at C.373 (stating the same as
to diocese); id. C.634, § 1 (stating the same as to religious orders); NEW COMMENTARY ON
CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 408.
31
See 1983 CODE C.116, § 1. A juridic person founded to serve the public good is a
“public juridic person.” Id. Hereafter, all juridic persons within a diocese shall be referred to
collectively as “parishes” for simplicity.
32
Id. C.1256.
33
See id. C.1257, § 1 (“All temporal goods which belong to the universal Church, the
Apostolic See, or other public juridic persons in the Church are ecclesiastical goods and are
governed by the following canons and their own statutes.”); see also id. C.1254–1310
(regulating the purchase, ownership, administration, and sale of Church property by juridic
persons to whom it belongs).
34
See id. C.1267, § 1 (offerings given to an administrator of a public juridic person are
presumed to be offerings to the public juridic person the individual administers); id. C.1267,
§ 3 (“Offerings given by the faithful can” only be used for the purpose for which they were
given).
35
See ADAM J. MAIDA & NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI, CHURCH PROPERTY, CHURCH FINANCES,
AND CHURCH-RELATED CORPORATIONS: A CANON LAW HANDBOOK 26 (1983) (“[A]ll property
is the property of one public juridic person or another.”).
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hierarchical. The Pope is the bishop of Rome, successor in that position to
Saint Peter.36 The Pope appoints bishops for each diocese.37 The bishop has
authority over each parish within the geographic boundaries of the diocese.38
In turn, the bishop appoints a pastor, typically a priest, to manage a parish.39
As noted above, canon law recognizes ownership of property in the
juridic person who acquired it.40 At the same time, that property is typically
administered by a juridic person senior in the hierarchy, for the benefit of the
juridic person.41 The Pope has plenary authority over all ecclesiastical
goods.42 The bishop is the administrator for property belonging to the
diocese, the juridic person that the bishop administers.43 The bishop does
not administer parish property—rather, a pastor (appointed by the bishop)
“exercises direct power of governance” over the parish44 and administers the
property belonging to the parish.45 The bishop’s role with respect to parish
property is indirect through his authority over the pastor who administers it.
The bishop is “to exercise careful vigilance over the administration of all
goods which belong to public juridic persons subject to him . . . .”46

36
See Roman Catholicism: Structure of the Church, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Roman-Catholicism/Structure-of-the-church (last visited
Feb. 11, 2019).
37
1983 CODE C.377, § 1; Pope Paul VI, Christus Dominus: Decree Concerning the
Pastoral Office of Bishops in the Church, HOLY SEE PRESS OFF. BULL. (Oct. 28, 1965),
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_decree_19651028_christus-dominus_en.html.
38
1983 CODE C.515.
39
Id. C.515, § 1 (“[P]astoral care is entrusted to a pastor . . . under the authority of the
diocesan bishop.”); see also NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 676
(“[T]he diocesan bishop . . . has authority over the pastor of each parish [within the
diocese].”).
40
1983 CODE C.1256.
41
Id. c.1279, § 1; see also NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 1474.
42
The Pope is the “supreme administrator and steward of all ecclesiastical goods.” 1983
CODE C.1273.
43
NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 1477.
44
1983 CODE C.532; THE CANON LAW SOC’Y OF GR. BRIT. & IR., THE CANON LAW
LETTER AND SPIRIT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE CODE OF CANON LAW 295 (Gerard Sheehy &
Francis G. Morrisey eds.,1996).
45
1983 CODE C.531, C.1276, C.532; see also id. at C.515, § 1; NEW COMMENTARY ON
CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 1477.
46
1983 CODE C.1276, § 1. The bishop designates certain transactions involving parish
property by type or size as extraordinary, for which the pastor must obtain the bishop’s
permission. Id. C.1281. Unlike parishes, religious institutes administer property outside the
supervisory authority of the bishop of the diocese in which they are geographically located.
Id. C.586, § 1 (acknowledging “a just autonomy of life, especially of governance . . . for
individual institutes”). Members of a religious institute, however, are subject to the bishop’s
authority “in those matters which regard the care of souls, the public exercise of divine
worship, and other works of the apostolate.” Id. C.678, §1.
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The Catholic bankruptcy cases opened wide the obvious tension
between the independence of parishes from the bishop as distinct juridic
persons and the bishop’s indirect authority over parishes and parish property.
One commenter described the question of whether parishes “own” property
as an example of how extreme interpretations of canon law are either as
“antinomian” or “legalistic,” and concluded that to attempt to translate canon
law hierarchical ownership rights into secular terms “disrupt[s] the unity of
law and theology” expressed in canon law.47 Another commenter put the
issue in much plainer terms, asserting that, under canon law, “[p]arishes are
not plums for the diocesan bishop to pick when he has debts to pay.”48
B. Organizational Law
Not all Catholic dioceses are organized alike. The differences among
them became key issues in their bankruptcy cases. State law varies on the
corporate forms available to religious organizations.49 Depending on state
law, Catholic organizations may choose among corporate forms, including
charitable trusts, unincorporated associations, corporation sole, religious
non-profit corporations, or general non-profit corporations.50
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, legislatures
extended special corporate sole charters for religious organizations including
Catholic dioceses, which otherwise could not incorporate.51 The corporation
sole form places all the management control of the organization in a single
person as agent for the corporation sole, e.g., the bishop of a Catholic diocese
and his successors.52 Like the ordinary non-profit corporate form, the
47

See COUGHLIN, supra note 24, at 176–79.
See, e.g., Nicholas P. Cafardi, The Availability of Parish Assets for Diocesan Debts:
A Canonical Analysis, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 361, 368 (2005).
49
See generally Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations,
1995 BYU L. REV. 439 (1995).
50
Id. at 441–42 (discussing that a 1995 survey revealed that eighty-seven percent of
religious organizations chose “the religious not-for-profit corporate form”). To qualify for
tax-exempt status, a non-profit corporation’s organizing documents must ensure that the
“members, officers, and directors . . . do not receive any profit” from the organization’s
operations. Id. at 442. This “nondistribution constraint” is also required for federal taxexempt status under the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018); Henry B.
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
51
For example, Washington’s corporation sole statute was enacted in 1915 to provide a
means for religious organizations to hold title to property distinctly from their members and
enjoy perpetual existence. Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re
Catholic Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 317 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part sub
nom. Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-0274-JLQ, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6025 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006), and rev’d in part sub nom. Comm. of
Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006).
52
Statutes typically provide that the sole manager of the corporation must have been duly
elected or chosen, and must act in accordance with the rules of the organization of which the
manager is a part. MAIDA & CAFARDI, supra note 35, at 128; see also Tort Claimants Comm.
48
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corporate sole form permits the survival of the corporation in perpetuity and
continuous ownership of property.53 The corporate sole form is loosely
consistent with the bishop’s supervisory responsibility over parishes and
other juridic persons within the diocese, but it is inconsistent with
recognition of parishes as juridic persons with the agency to own property
distinct from the bishop.54
In the 1980’s as state legislatures extended corporate status to nonprofit religious corporations, canonists considered whether the corporate sole
form continued to be appropriate, and, if so, whether parishes within
corporation sole dioceses should separately incorporate and hold title to the
property that canon law attributed to them. Advocates for the status quo
(diocese as corporation sole with centralized title to property) lauded it as an
efficient means for the bishop to use parish property as collateral for diocesan
or parish projects at capital costs more favorable than could be achieved by
individual parishes borrowing against parish property.55 An author of a
handbook on Church property and finance opined that a Catholic diocese
could be organized variously as a corporation sole, a non-profit religious
corporation, or as an entity without corporate form. He offered no guidance
for a bishop to choose among these forms, or how the diocese and its parishes
should hold title to property within the secular corporate structure he chose.56
He opined blithely that secular law was irrelevant. Secular courts would
apply canon law to supply the terms of implied trusts in favor of parishes
“because it is that law which governs the use of these Church assets.”57 No
doubt, the author was unconcerned about the prospect of diocesan
bankruptcy cases.
v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Portland in Or.), 345 B.R. 686, 697 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006) (finding a distinction between the
Archdiocese of Portland and the “office of the Archbishop” for purposes of interpretation of
an express trust, as the former is the corporate entity whereas the latter is the ecclesiastical
office of the Archbishop under Canon law); Gerstenblith, supra note 49, at 454 (noting that,
as of 1995, twenty-six states permitted incorporation of a religious organization as a
corporation sole).
53
See, e.g., Cty. of San Luis Obispo v. Ashurst, 194 Cal. Rptr. 5, 8 (Ct. App. 1983) (“The
creditors of the corporation sole may not look to the assets of the individual holding office,
nor may the creditors of the individual look to the assets held by the corporation sole.”); see
also Gerstenblith, supra note 49, at 455.
54
NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 164, 1457.
55
See R. Kealy, Methods of Diocesan Incorporation, CANON LAW SOC’Y OF AM. PROCS.
163–77 (1986); see also, e.g., Baxter v. McDonnell, 49 N.E. 667, 668 (N.Y. 1898) (finding
that where Catholic bishop held title to an unincorporated church in his name, “[t]he purpose
of this arrangement is to exclude the laity from that power of interference which they would
have were the title vested in a corporation”).
56
See Kealy, supra note 55, at 163–77. In any case, the bishop holds title to parish assets
“in accordance with canon law . . . as civil law trustee for the parish . . . [under] an amalgam
of these individual parish trusts.” Id.
57
Id. at 131 (citing 1983 CODE C.1257).

REILLY (DO NOT DELETE)

882

6/3/2019 5:02 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:871

Today, in light of the clergy sexual abuse scandal, the financial
advantages of bishop-centered control over property have disappeared,
swamped by the liability risk. In 2000, two years before the Archdiocese of
Boston scandal broke, canon law scholars noted that organization of a
diocese as a corporation sole with centralized title to property, and without
separate incorporation of parishes, is “[i]ncompatible with the law of the
Church [and] long ago disapproved by the Holy See.”58 Perhaps wryly, they
noted that bishops and their financial officers and advisers “should make
every effort to see that the laws of the Church . . . are faithfully followed.”59
As Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have
recognized, organizational law defines the set of assets to which an
organization’s creditors have recourse and shields from those creditors other
property not within that set.60 Unlike canon law, which governs rights and
relationships among juridic persons within the Church, a bankruptcy
proceeding reveals the external effect of secular organizational law on the
organization’s creditors.
In no other legal setting is scrutiny of
organizational form, property rights, and agency more energetically
undertaken.
III. PARISH PROPERTY AS PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
A. Property of the Estate Basics
Consider the importance of property of the estate issues in bankruptcy
cases generally. In a Chapter 7 case, the trustee for the estate marshals,
liquidates, and distributes property of the estate to creditors in satisfaction of
the debtor’s pre-petition debts61 In contrast, in a Chapter 11 case, the debtor
and creditors engage in bankruptcy court-supervised negotiation towards a
plan of reorganization that can preserve at least some of the debtor’s going
concern value, settle creditors’ claims, and provide for discharge of prepetition debts.62

58

NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 164 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 164, 1457.
60
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (“[T]he essential role of all forms of organizational law is to
provide for the creation of a pattern of creditors’ rights—a form of ‘asset partitioning’—that
could not practicably be established otherwise.” (footnote omitted)).
61
See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (2018) (claims allowance process); id. § 506 (secured claims); id.
§ 507 (priority among unsecured creditors); id. § 725 (distribution of property to holders of
secured claims; id. § 726 (priority of distribution of property of the estate.).
62
See Chapter 11 - Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Aug. 15,
2018).
59
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Property of the estate issues frame negotiation among the parties in a
Chapter 11 case.63 Among other requirements, to confirm a plan of
reorganization over the objection of a creditor, a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization must provide a payout to the objecting creditor with a present
value at least equal to the payout that creditor would receive upon liquidation
of property of the estate in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case.64 This
confirmation requirement is called the “best interest test.” It protects a
dissenting creditor from the consequences of a Chapter 11 plan if the plan
payout is not in its “best interest’ relative to the alternative hypothetical
Chapter 7 liquidation payout.65 To satisfy the requirement, the disclosure
statement accompanying a plan must provide a hypothetical valuation of
property of the estate so creditors can determine whether the plan satisfies
the test.66 Given the best interest test, the more property included within the
estate and the greater its value, the more leverage for unsecured creditors in
the Chapter 11 plan negotiation.67
The legal contexts in which property of the estate issues arose in the
Catholic bankruptcy cases differed depending on the debtor’s organizational
structure, the organizational structure of parishes within the diocese subject
to the bishop’s canonical authority, and the respective rights of the debtors
and parishes in property under secular law.
Filing a petition in bankruptcy creates an estate that includes, with
certain exceptions, “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case.”68 Section 541 defines “[p]roperty of
63
To confirm a plan in a Chapter 11 case, the plan must meet the requirements of § 1129.
If the debtor is a non-profit corporation, any “transfers of property under the plan shall be
made in accordance with any applicable provisions of nonbankruptcy law that govern the
transfer of property.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(16) (2018).
64
Id. § 1129(a)(7).
65
Id. A Chapter 11 plan proponent ordinarily must include a hypothetical liquidation
analysis in the disclosure statement accompanying the plan so that creditors can determine if
the proposed plan is in their best interest. Id. § 1125(b) (to solicit votes on a plan, the plan
proponent must provide a disclosure statement containing “adequate information”); In re
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., No. 04-37154, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1180, at
*19–20 (Bankr. D. Or. Apr. 13, 2007) (finding that the plan provided that the objecting
creditors would be paid in full, so no hypothetical liquidation analysis was required); CHARLES
JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1123–24 (2d ed. 2009) (observing that most
disclosure statements include a hypothetical liquidation analysis).
66
§ 1125(a)–(b).
67
See, e.g., Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic
Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 317 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part sub nom.
Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-0274-JLQ, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6025 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006), and rev’d in part sub nom. Comm. of Tort
Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006) (“Resolution of this
adversary proceeding in favor of the plaintiff would result in the debtor having more assets
with which to pay the claims held by the members of the plaintiff.”).
68
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2018) (“The commencement of a case . . . creates an estate . . .
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the estate;” state law defines what rights qualify for the status of “a legal or
equitable interest of the debtor in property.”69
Although the definition of property of the estate in § 541 is
straightforward, application of § 541 is complicated because property rights
are complicated. The general rule under bankruptcy law is that parties who
hold rights in property of the estate maintain their rights notwithstanding the
debtor’s bankruptcy. For example, a creditor with a valid security interest in
property of the estate with priority over the estate’s interest in that property
under state law is generally entitled to priority of its interest over the estate’s
interest in that property.70 Similarly, a third party who holds a valid
beneficial interest in property subject to a trust under which the debtor holds
legal title maintains that beneficial interest in property notwithstanding the
debtor’s bankruptcy. Only the debtor’s legal title to property becomes
property of the estate; the third party’s beneficial interest in the property does
not.71
The Archdiocese of Portland and the Dioceses of Tucson, Spokane, San
Diego, Fairbanks, Gallup, Stockton, Helena and Great Falls-Billings were
organized as corporations sole at the time of their filings.72 Except for those
within the Diocese of Stockton, the parishes were not separately
incorporated.73 The respective bishops, as the lone agents for the
comprised of all of the following property, wherever located and by whomever held: (1)
[subject to certain exceptions,] all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of
the commencement of the case.”). The estate also includes property the trustee recovers by
exercise of the statutory powers. Id. § 541(a)(3), (4). Section 541(b) excludes certain of the
debtor’s property interests from the estate and thereby protects such interests from creditors’
claims. Id. § 541(b). Hereafter, all references to section numbers refer to Chapter 11 of the
United States Code, unless otherwise indicated.
69
See id. § 541(a); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979), superseded in part
by statute, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified at
11 U.S.C §§ 100–112 (2018)), as recognized in Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC (In re
Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc.), 519 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2008); Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.),
335 B.R. 842, 854 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005) (noting that § 541 defines property of the estate, but
state law defines what is property).
70
11 U.S.C. § 724(b)(1) (2018).
71
§ 541(d) (“Property in which the debtor holds . . . only legal title . . . becomes property
of the estate . . . only to the extent of the debtor’s legal title to such property, but not to the
extent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold.”); see, e.g.,
Hunter v. St. Vincent Med. Ctr. (In re Parkview Hosp.), 211 B.R. 619 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1997) (finding a fund that was subject to a charitable trust excluded from debtor’s estate under
§ 541(d)).
72
See infra Appendix A: Case Information (listing corporate form for each debtor based
on information provided by debtors in disclosure statements).
73
Id. Although the Diocese of Stockton was organized as a corporation sole, each of the
parishes were also organized as separate corporations sole. See In re Roman Catholic Bishop
of Stockton, No. 14-20371, 2017 WL 118013, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2017); Debtor’s
Disclosure Statement Regarding Plan of Reorganization at 12, In re Roman Catholic Bishop
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corporations soles, were the record title holders to all ecclesiastical property
without differentiation as to whether it “belonged” to the diocese or to the
parishes under canon law.
The Archdioceses of Milwaukee, Saint Paul and Minneapolis, and the
Dioceses of Davenport, Wilmington, Stockton, Helena, Duluth, New Ulm,
and Great Falls-Billings were organized as non-profit or religious
corporations at the time of filing.74 Within these archdioceses and dioceses,
parishes and other affiliated entities were separately incorporated and held
record title to property.75 The three religious institute debtors, (Oregon
Province, Society of Jesus (the Jesuits), Christian Brothers of Ireland, New
York and Crosier Fathers and Brothers), were all organized as non-profit
corporations. One of these debtors, the Oregon Province, Society of the
Jesus, was comprised of individual communities, many of which were not
separately incorporated.76
For debtors organized as corporations sole with title to property
centralized in the bishop, the debtors asserted that they held only legal title
to certain property in trust for parishes, schools, cemeteries or other juridic
persons whose separate interests the bishop must safeguard and respect
under canon law. Sexual abuse claimants argued that state law and the
Bankruptcy Code exclusively governed property rights, effectively stripping
parishes of any rights in property formally titled in the bishop’s name,
notwithstanding their beneficial “ownership” of property under canon law.
Sexual abuse creditors used a reverse strategy in cases of debtors
organized as religious corporations with separately incorporated parishes
with their own legal title to property. In these cases, the debtors did not
include in their estates property titled in the names of separately incorporated
parishes. Sexual abuse creditors tried to capture parish property into the
debtors’ estates using a variety of legal arguments, all of which elevated the
substance of the bishop’s canonical authority over parishes and their
of Stockson, No. 14-20371 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2014); see also In re Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. at 849; Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese
of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 310 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005),
aff’d in part sub nom. Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-050274-JLQ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6025 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006), and rev’d in part sub
nom. Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash.
2006).
74
See infra Appendix A: Case Information.
75
Id. Parishes within the Diocese of Stockton held title to property separately from the
diocese. Although the Diocese of Stockton was organized as a corporation sole, parishes
within the diocese were organized separately as corporations sole yielding a decentralized
property structure analogous to that in dioceses organized as religious corporations with
separately incorporated parishes. See In re Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton, 2017 WL
118013.
76
See Disclosure Statement Regarding First Modified Joint Plan of Reorganization at
20–24, In re Soc’y of Jesus, Or. Province, No. 3:09-bk-30938 (Bankr. D. Or. 2011).
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property over parishes’ independent corporate status and separate title to
property under secular law.
B. Corporations Sole
Debtors organized as corporations sole listed in their schedules all
property titled in the name of the bishop. They asserted that the bishop’s
title to property attributed to parishes under canon law was subject to a trust
in favor of the parishes to whom the property belonged under canon law.
Because parish property was subject to a trust in favor of the parishes, it was
not included in the estate under § 541(d).77 For parishes (not separately
incorporated) to hold a valid beneficial interest in property, however, they
had to have the legal capacity to hold title to it.
The Diocese of Tucson asserted that the closest analogy for the legal
status of its parishes was unincorporated associations.78 The diocese noted
that Arizona law does not recognize legal agency for an unincorporated
association to own property and, for that reason, the diocese held title to
parish property.79 Even so, it asserted, “the Diocese does not have any
equitable, beneficial or proprietary interest in the Parish Real Property.”80
Unsecured creditors’ committees representing sexual abuse claimants
in both the Spokane and Portland cases objected to their respective debtor’s
trust theories regarding parish property.81 In particular, they argued that the
alleged trusts were invalid under state law and not entitled to respect under
bankruptcy law.82 The stakes were high. Attorneys for sexual abuse
77
In In re Archbishop of Portland in Or., the debtor asserted that, “although it holds legal
title to approximately $98 million in deposits and investment accounts and an extensive
amount of real estate, most of that property is held in trust.” 335 B.R. at 848. In In re Catholic
Bishop of Spokane, the debtor similarly asserted that, with certain exceptions, property listed
on its schedules was held for the benefit of parishes, schools, cemeteries, and other diocesan
entities. 329 B.R. at 310. The Diocese of Spokane explained in its Statement of Financial
Affairs that the diocese “has no equitable beneficial or proprietary interest in this [parish]
property, but, in some cases, holds mere legal title[,]” and also that some property “is subject
to a restriction imposed by the donor or grantor.” Id.
78
Third Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement Regarding Plan of Reorganization
at 31, In re Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Tucson, No. 4:04-bk-04721-JMM
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-0274-JLQ,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6025, at *3–4 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006); In re Archbishop of
Portland in Or., 335 B.R. at 848. In Catholic Diocese of Spokane, the district court affirmed
the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the tort claimants’ committee had standing to challenge
by adversary action the debtor’s characterization of property of the estate. 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6025, at *15.
82
In In re Archbishop of Portland in Or., the sexual abuse claimants’ committee sought
a declaration that property listed on the debtors’ schedules was “held in trust” for parishes
was property of the estate free of any third-party interests. 335 B.R. at 848. In In re Catholic
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claimants in the Portland case estimated that including property the debtor
attributed to trusts in favor of 124 diocesan parishes and schools would yield
an estate of about $500 million dollars compared to assets valued at about
$19 million which debtor had scheduled as property of the estate.83
In both cases, the parishes organized into informal committees with
standing to intervene in the adversary actions over property of the estate.84
In the Spokane case, parishes contended that the diocese held the disputed
property in a constructive trust either for their benefit or for the benefit of
individual parishioners.85 The court rejected the contention that parishioners
could hold a beneficial interest in parish property. Even though parishioners
made gifts to their parishes with the understanding that the parish would use
the gifts exclusively for the parish, the donor parishioners acquired no
property interest in the gifted property.86 As to whether parishes could be
beneficiaries of a constructive trust, the threshold question was the legal
status of parishes as entities distinct from the debtor. The bankruptcy court
assumed without deciding that the parishes were distinct legal entities.87
Even so, there could be no constructive trust in favor of parishes because the
deeds that named the bishop as sole title holder were the exclusive source of
evidence of title. The court declined to consider the affidavit evidence from
pastors, parishioners, and other benefactors in support of a constructive trust
for parishes.88 It entered partial summary judgment in favor of the creditors’
Bishop of Spokane, the committee challenged the debtors’ characterization of twenty-two
parcels of real property as held in trust for parishes, and moved for an order consolidating the
non-debtor defendants with the debtor. 329 B.R. at 310–11.
83
See Steve Woodward, Class Action Possible in Church Case, OREGONIAN (May 26,
2005), http://www.bishop-accountability.org/news2005_01_06/2005_05_26_Woodward_Cl
assAction.htm; see also Joe Feuerherd, Portland Bankruptcy Seen as High-Risk Strategy,
NAT’L CATH. REP. (July 30, 2004) (noting that archdiocesan attorneys reported at a hearing
$100 million in investment accounts, most held for the accounts of parishes and affiliated
entities). In the Tucson case, the diocese was smaller (seventy-five parishes), but the
differential was proportionately large. Sexual abuse claimants estimated the value of property
of the estate, including parish property, at $110 million dollars compared with $16 million
listed by the diocese. See Stephanie Innes, Diocese Files Bankruptcy, ARIZ. DAILY STAR
(Sept. 21, 2004), https://tucson.com/lifestyles/faith-and-values/diocese-files-bankruptcy/artic
le_87a37557-4fc0-5da5-b408-bef688bef24d.html; Stephanie Innes, Diocese Set to Split with
Its Parishes, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Sept. 23, 2004), http://www.bishopaccountability.org/news2004_07_12/2004_09_23_Innes_DioceseSet.htm.
84
In re Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. at 848–49; In re Catholic Bishop of
Spokane, 329 B.R. at 331; see also Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Keeping the Faith: The Rights
of Parishioners in Church Reorganizations, 82 WASH. L. REV. 75, 91–110 (2007).
85
In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 329 n.8.
86
Id. at 330 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. a, § 125, § 37 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 1959)).
87
Id. at 330–31; see also Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364
B.R. 81, 91 (E.D. Wash. 2006) (noting that the bankruptcy court’s assumption was “correct”
and that “the Parishes are unincorporated associations”).
88
In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 331; see also In re Catholic Diocese of
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committee, finding that the disputed parish real property was property of the
estate free of any trust.89 Even if the parishes could establish a trust in their
favor under Washington law, because constructive or resulting trusts are
equitable remedies, the parishes’ interest was at best an “inchoate right” as
of the filing of the petition and not a beneficial interest in property distinct
from the estate’s interest.90 Finally, even if under Washington law a
constructive or resulting trust was a property interest, it was unrecorded and
therefore subject to the trustee’s power to avoid unrecorded interests under
§ 544(a)(3).91 The decision was a stunning and significant setback for the
Diocese of Spokane, and for Catholic dioceses organized as corporations
sole with similarly centralized title to property.92
Ten months later, the district court reviewing de novo reversed.93 It
found issues of fact on the validity of a trust in favor of parishes under
Washington law based on the distinction between constructive trust and a
resulting trust.94 A constructive trust arises as a remedy for fraud by the title
holder on the constructive trust beneficiary.95 In contrast, a resulting trust
arises in favor of the person who paid to acquire property (the beneficiary)
when a title to property is conveyed to a record title holder who is someone
Spokane, 364 B.R. at 91 (noting that the bankruptcy court did not consider the affidavit
testimony).
89
In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 333.
90
Id. at 332 (citing Airwork Corp. v. Markair Express, Inc. (In re Markair, Inc.), 172
B.R. 638, 642 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994)).
91
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2018); In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 333
(recognizing that the debtor in possession can exercise the trustee’s power to avoid unrecorded
interests in real property and that the court could grant derivative standing to exercise that
power to the creditors’ committee). The trustee’s strong arm power to avoid unperfected
interests in property reinforces state law that requires public notice of non-possessory property
interests (for example, real property recording laws and public filing requirements for
personal property security interests). See generally David Gray Carlson, The Trustee’s Strong
Arm Power Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 S.C. L. REV. 841 (1991).
92
See, e.g., Joe Feuerherd, Diocesan Bankruptcies Raise Church Ownership Issues,
NAT’L CATH. REP. (Sept. 9, 2005), www.natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives2/2005c/090905/0
90905a.php (“The settlement dollars just went up dramatically . . . and the claimants hold all
the cards.” (quoting Sam Gerdano, Exec. Dir. of the Am. Bankr. Inst.)); Seattle Times Staff,
Bankruptcy Judge Rules Parish Assets Available to Victims, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 26, 2005),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/bankruptcy-judge-rules-parish-assets-availableto-victims/ (reporting that “Barbara Blaine, president of the Survivors Network of those
Abused by Priests (“SNAP”), said . . . that she hoped the ruling would prompt leaders of other
dioceses to stop fighting victims”).
93
In re Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. at 91, 95.
94
Id. at 92–95.
95
E.g., Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank. v. Saloman Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250–51
(2000) (“Whenever the legal title to property is obtained through means or under
circumstances ‘which render it unconscientious for the holder of the legal title to retain and
enjoy the beneficial interest, equity impresses a constructive trust on the property thus
acquired in favor of the one who is truly and equitably entitled to the same . . . .’” (quoting 2
J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 103, 628-29 (1886).
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other than that person (the trustee).96 Washington courts recognize a
resulting trust based on the circumstances of the conveyance of title, and not
exclusively based on the deed.97 The district court came close to calling the
bankruptcy court’s disregard of the affidavit evidence the parishes had
submitted absurd—if only the record of title is relevant as to whether
property is subject to a resulting trust, then no resulting trust would ever
arise.98
The district court further held that a resulting trust could survive the
trustee’s power to avoid unrecorded interests in real property under §
544(a)(3).99 Under some states’ laws, the circumstances that give rise to a
resulting trust may amount to constructive notice of the beneficiary’s
interest, which as a matter of state law precludes the possibility of a bona
fide purchaser.100 Section 544(a)(3) relieves the trustee from the effect of
actual knowledge of an unrecorded interest, but does not relieve the trustee
of the effect of constructive notice.101 The court held that summary judgment
on this issue was inappropriate because of fact issues as to whether, under
Washington law, the circumstances surrounding parishes’ acquisition of
parish property constituted constructive notice of the parishes’ beneficial
96

In re Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. at 92–93 (citing Brown v. State, 924 P.2d
908 (Wash. 1996)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 448 (AM. LAW
INST. 1959) (describing circumstances in which a “resulting trust” arises).
97
In re Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. at 92 (citing Brown, 924 P.2d at 911–12).
98
Id. at 93, 95. Moreover, if a resulting trust arose, it could be a property interest (and
not merely an inchoate right) at the time of filing. Under Washington law, a resulting trust
arises at the time of the conveyance to the title holder and, unlike a constructive trust, does
not depend on a court order. Id. at 93 (citing GEORGE G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 327
(2d ed. rev. 1979)).
99
Brown, 924 P.2d at 93 (citing In re Torrez, 827 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1987)).
100
For example, under California law, there can be no bona fide purchaser of property
from the holder of legal title to property that is held subject to a resulting trust if the
beneficiary’s possession of the property constitutes constructive notice of his equitable
interest. See, e.g., In re Weisman, 5 F.3d 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that under
California law, a trustee takes free of actual knowledge but not constructive notice, and that a
trustee’s constructive notice of a prior interest precludes bona fide purchaser status); Brady v.
Pohlman (In re Bittner), No. 08-43037, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2530, at * 12 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
June 9, 2009) (holding that the trustee had constructive notice of a resulting trust and thus
lacked bona fide purchaser status under 11. U.S.C. § 544(a)(3)).
101
See, e.g., Stern v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Asher), 488 B.R. 58, 73
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding under New York law, the trustee’s avoiding power under §
544(a)(3) is subject to constructive notice). A few courts have limited the trustee’s avoiding
power under § 544(a)(3) against the holder of an implied equitable lien based on the equities
of the situation. See, e.g., In re 28th Legislative Dist. Cmty. Dev. Corp., No. 10-14804, 2011
Bankr. LEXIS 4411 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Nov. 10, 2011) (holding debtor non-profit community
development organization held properties purchased with grant funding in trust for grant
providers under federal law, beneficial interests of trust beneficiaries not subject to avoidance
under § 544(a)(3)); In re W. Cent. Hous. Dev. Org., 338 B.R. 482, 486 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005)
(same); Gaffney v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (In re Premier Airways, Inc.), 303 B.R. 295 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 2003) (same).
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interest in it.102
Meanwhile, during the interval between the bankruptcy and district
court opinions in the Spokane case, the Portland bankruptcy court considered
the creditors’ committee’s request for a ruling that the parishes were legally
indistinct from the debtor, and therefore could not be beneficiaries of an
implied trust.103 The bankruptcy court held that under Oregon law,
unincorporated parishes had no capacity to sue, be sued, or hold title to real
property.104 However, it held that parishioners and other donors who
contributed to the acquisition and maintenance of parish real property might
have a beneficial interest in it.105
C. Religious Corporations with Separately Incorporated Parishes
1. Transfer Avoidance
Advocates for sexual abuse creditors in the cases of debtors organized
as religious corporations with separately incorporated parishes sought to use
tools available under bankruptcy law to capture property titled in separately
incorporated parishes as part of property of the diocesan debtor’s estate. The
Bankruptcy Code includes statutory provisions known collectively as the
“trustee’s avoiding powers” under which the bankruptcy trustee, as agent for
the estate, may avoid certain property interests of third parties, or reverse
certain pre-petition transfers of property by the debtor to third parties.106 By
exercising an avoiding power, the trustee can capture a property interest from
its holder and thereby augment the estate.107 In the cases where the debtor
was incorporated separately from parishes that held title to their own
property, transfer avoidance litigation focused on the trustee’s power to
avoid fraudulent transfers under § 544(b)(1) and § 548.108
102

In re Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 at 95.
Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 868 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005). The debtor
argued only that the parishes were separate entities from the debtor and apparently conceded
that schools were not separate entities. Id. at 865.
104
Id. at 866 (citing F.E.L. Publ’ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 754 F.2d 216, 221
(7th Cir. 1985) (holding the archbishop not liable for tortious interference in a business
relationship between the parish and a third party because the parish was not legally distinct
from the archbishop)).
105
Id. at 862–63.
106
See TABB, supra note 65, at 465.
107
See id. at 474 (noting that one of the purposes of the avoiding powers is to maximize
the value of the estate available for distribution to all creditors). See generally Thomas H.
Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725 (1984) (asserting that the
avoiding powers fall into two categories, one that adjusts the rights of creditors relative to
each other, and the other that adjusts the rights of creditors relative to the debtor).
108
Section 548 provides a uniform federal fraudulent transfer avoiding power. See 11
U.S.C. § 548 (2018). Section 544(b) gives the trustee the right to avoid a transfer that a
103
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The onslaught of fraudulent transfer challenges in their bankruptcy
cases could not have been a surprise to the debtors. Intense national media
attention to the clergy sexual abuse scandal following the Boston
Archdiocese story in 2002 provided Catholic bishops with powerful
incentive to consider the organizational structure and property holdings of
entities within their dioceses and to take action to protect parish assets from
diocesan creditors.109 The media noted dioceses’ asset-protective transfer
activity.110 In the media and in court, the debtors characterized the prepetition transfers as benign acts to conform the parishes’ formal title to
property with their “ownership” right in such property under canon law.111
In contrast, sexual abuse claimants’ lawyers and the media characterized
such transfers as malevolent actions to defraud sexual abuse claimants.112
creditor of the estate could avoid under state fraudulent transfer law. See id. § 544(b)
109
See Jill S. Manny, Governance Issues for Non-Profit Religious Organizations, 40
CATH. LAW. 1, 1 (2000) (recommending that corporation sole dioceses separately incorporate
parishes, dioceses, and fund-raising entities that support them to protect such entities from
diocesan liability).
110
See, e.g., Frank Gibney, Jr., Can a Church Go Broke?, TIME (May 26, 2002),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,250016,00.html (“[S]everal dioceses
have persuaded plaintiffs to accept reduced settlements, on the grounds that they could not
afford to pay more” while “leaders divide church property among dozens if not hundreds of
separate corporations, charities and other institutions.”); Laurie Goodstein, Dolan Sought to
Protect
Church
Assets,
Files
Show,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
1,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/us/dolan-sought-vatican-permission-to-shield-assets.h
tml; Jean Guccione, Diocese Accused of Moving Assets to Avoid Paying Sex-Abuse Claims,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2004), articles.latimes.com/2004/aug/18/local/me-priests18 (reporting
that several California dioceses transferred title to property held by the bishop to parishes to
shield it from sexual abuse creditors); Jean Hopfensperger & Jennifer Bjorhus, Minn.
Archdiocese Transfer of Assets May Protect It from Bankruptcy Creditors, STAR TRIB. (Feb.
2, 2015), http://www.startribune.com/archdiocese-shifted-assets-before-filing-bankruptcy/29
0400991/.
111
See, e.g., Objection and Response to Motion for Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors for Authority to Commence, Prosecute and Settle Litigation on Behalf of Bankr.
Estate Against the Holy See and Diocese-Related Entities at 5–6, Unaatuq, LLC v. Green (In
re Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska), 509 B.R. 229 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2014) [hereinafter Northern
Alaska Debtor’s Objection and Response] (explaining the transfer of $3 million contributed
to and held by the diocese in trust for parishes to the Catholic Trust of Northern Alaska as
formalizing a pre-existing trust), aff’d, 525 B.R. 723 (D. Alaska 2015), aff’d, 668 F. App’x
269 (9th Cir. 2016); Archdiocese Clarifies 7th Circuit Court Ruling on Cemetery Trust in
Chapter 11, ARCHDIOCESE OF MILWAUKEE (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.archmil.org/News2.0/Archdiocese-Clarifies-7th-Circuit-Court-Ruling-on-Cemetery-Trust-in-Chapter-11.htm
[hereinafter Archiodece Clarifies 7th Circuit Court Ruling].
112
See, e.g., Milo Gyelin, As Sex-Abuse Suits Mount, Church Tries to Protect Real-Estate
Assets, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2002), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1021421244584746560
(quoting counsel for tort plaintiffs accusing dioceses of “going through their assets and
shoving them back to local parishes”); Hopfensperger & Bjorhus, supra note 110 (quoting
David Clohessy, the national director of Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests
(“SNAP”), as characterizing the Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis’s pre-petition
transfers as “self-serving financial maneuvers” and asking whether anyone could “honestly
claim that Jesus would have spent time and energy shielding assets?”).
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2. Derivative Standing
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the power to avoid transfers belongs to the
bankruptcy trustee113 or, in a Chapter 11 case, to the debtor in possession
exercising the powers of the trustee.114 Neither individual creditors nor a
committee of creditors can assert the trustee’s avoiding powers without a
grant of derivative standing from the bankruptcy court.115 Bankruptcy courts
grant derivative standing if the particular avoidance action the committee
wants to pursue is “colorable” and if the debtor in possession is “unjustified”
in failing to pursue it based on a cost-benefit analysis.116
The cost-benefit test for derivative standing was an issue in the Diocese
of Northern Alaska case. Like the dioceses of Spokane and Portland, the
Diocese of Northern Alaska had held title to all property, including the real
property used by parishes and other diocesan affiliates.117 In 2007, the year
before the diocese filed for relief, it amended its articles of incorporation to

113
See § 544(a) (“The trustee shall have . . . the rights and powers of, or may avoid any
transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor . . . .”); id. §
547(b)(“Except as provided . . . the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor
in property . . . .”); id. § 548(a)(1) (“The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . .”).
114
See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2018)(“[A] debtor in possession shall have all the rights . . .
and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties . . . of a trustee serving in a case
under this chapter.”). The debtor in possession is the fiduciary and legal representative for
the estate in a Chapter 11 case, with the power to sue and be sued. See 11 U.S.C. § 323(b)
(2018). The debtor in possession, as the “trustee,” also has primary standing to bring
avoidance actions. See TABB, supra note 65, at 1055.
115
See, e.g., Estate of Spirtos v. One San Bernardino Cty. Superior Court, 443 F.3d 1172,
1175–76 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that a creditor cannot assert a Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim on behalf of the estate without authorization from
the court or the Chapter 7 trustee); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics
Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 567 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that
Congress approved of derivative standing for committees to exercise the trustee’s avoiding
powers and that bankruptcy courts could grant derivative standing as an exercise of general
equitable powers where the debtor in possession unreasonably refused to pursue an avoidance
claim); Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding creditor may obtain
bankruptcy court permission to bring an adversary action if the trustee unjustifiably refuses
to do so).
116
See, e.g., PW Enters., Inc. v. N.D. Racing Comm’n (In re Racing Servs., Inc.), 540
F.3d 892, 901 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that determination of whether the trustee unjustifiably
refuses to bring an avoidance action requires the court to perform a cost benefit analysis);
Unsecured Creditors Comm. of STN Enters., Inc. v. Noyes (In re STN Enters.), 779 F.2d 901,
904 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that a committee must show that the action it seeks to take
on behalf of the debtor in possession is a colorable claim and that the debtor in possession
unjustifiably failed to pursue it, with unjustifiability turning on a cost-benefit analysis as to
whether pursuit of the action is likely to benefit the estate); Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. v.
Farmers Savs. Bank (In re Toledo Equip. Co.), 35 B.R. 315, 320 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983)
(finding that a committee must show that the debtor in possession’s refusal to bring an action
is “unjustifiable or abusive of their discretion”).
117
See infra Appendix A: Case Information.
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clarify that it held title to parish property in an express trust for parishes.118
In the bankruptcy case, the creditors’ committee moved for derivative
standing to avoid the express trusts as fraudulent transfers.119 The court
denied the motion.120 The Diocese of Northern Alaska covered 410,000
square miles with forty-six parishes and seventeen priests, but only eight
parishes raised enough from contributions of parishioners to cover their
expenses.121 Given the insolvency of parishes and the low likelihood of
recovery even if the avoidance action was successful, the cost of litigation to
avoid transfers from the diocese to the parishes was simply not worth the
candle.122
In the Archdiocese of Milwaukee case, the creditors’ committee tried
and failed to obtain derivative standing to recover $35 million in pre-petition
transfers the Archdiocese had made to parishes out of a diocesan investment
fund (“the Fund”). The Archdiocese held title to the Fund into which
parishes made deposits—a pooled-investment account. About seven years
before it filed for bankruptcy, the Archdiocese dissolved the Fund and
transferred to parishes the amounts each had deposited into it.123 The
committee alleged that the transfers were avoidable fraudulent transfers
under § 544(b)(1) and Wisconsin fraudulent transfer law.124
The bankruptcy court denied the committee’s motion for derivative
standing to challenge the transfers out of the Fund because the proposed
118
See Northern Alaska Debtor’s Objection and Response, supra note 111, at 4–5. At the
same time, each parish recorded a “notice of beneficial interest” in real property in the local
property records reflecting the parish’s beneficial interest in parish real property titled in the
name of the bishop. Id.
119
See Motion for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Authority to
Commence, Prosecute and Settle Litigation on Behalf of Bankruptcy Estate Against the Holy
See and Diocese-Related Entities at 5–8, Unaatuq, LLC v. Green (In re Catholic Bishop of N.
Alaska), 509 B.R. 229 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2014) [hereinafter Northern Alaska Creditors’
Committee Motion] aff’d, 525 B.R. 723 (D. Alaska 2015), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 269 (9th Cir.
2016).
120
See Memorandum Regarding Committee’s Motion to Pursue Litigation and Debtor’s
Motion to Strike at 13–14, Unaatuq, LLC v. Green (In re Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska), 509
B.R. 229 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2014) [hereinafter Memorandum Regarding Committee’s
Motion] aff’d, 525 B.R. 723 (D. Alaska 2015), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 269 (9th Cir. 2016).
121
See Northern Alaska Debtor’s Objection and Response, supra note 111, at 8. Most of
the parish property at issue was inaccessible by road and about one-third of the target parishes
lacked running water. Id. at 15.
122
See id. at 16. The court did grant the committee derivative standing to pursue an
avoidance action regarding a $3 million transfer between a pooled investment fund the diocese
had operated for the benefit of parishes and a trust the diocese created to administer the fund
within a year before it filed for relief. See id.
122
The court found that the cost-benefit analysis for pursuit of this cash transfer was
relatively straightforward, and that the debtor was unjustified in its refusal to pursue a
fraudulent transfer avoidance action against the trust. See id. at 16–17.
123
See In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. 855, 864 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2012).
124
See id. at 858.
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action was not colorable. First, it was time-barred under the Wisconsin
statute of limitations.125 Second, the parishes were good faith transferees
expressly protected from fraudulent transfer avoidance under Wisconsin
law.126 Moreover, assuming the avoidance action was colorable, the debtor’s
failure to sue parish transferees was not unjustified. The committee had
conceded that litigation against parishes would cost the estate more than $1
million in legal fees.127 The court considered the overall impact of fraudulent
transfer litigation against parish transferees. To pay their fraudulent transfer
debts, parishes would turn to parishioners, students, and benefactors to
provide funds, which would “have an adverse effect” on their willingness to
support the debtor which was critical to the debtor’s ability to continue to
operate and fund a Chapter 11 plan.128 Moreover, if the committee prevailed,
the parishes would file claims for reimbursement against the debtor, adding
to the pool of creditors and diluting the effect of recovery from parishes for
sexual abuse claimants.129
After this defeat, sexual abuse claimants in the Milwaukee case raised
a second fraudulent transfer challenge to a pre-petition transfer. This
125
See id. at 866; see also WIS. STAT. § 893.425(1) (2017) (“An action with respect to a
fraudulent transfer . . . shall be barred unless the action is commenced . . . within 4 years after
the transfer is made . . . or, if later, within one year after the transfer . . . is or could reasonably
have been discovered by the claimant.”).
126
See In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. at 866 (“In short, the status of the
Archbishop as president and board member of the Parish corporations does not, without more,
render the Parishes bad faith transferees . . . .”); see also WIS. STAT. § 242.08(1) (2017)
(providing a defense for a “person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent
value”).
127
In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. at 869–70. About a year earlier, a pooled
investment account, was a hot button issue in the Diocese of Wilmington case. Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc. (In re Catholic
Diocese of Wilmington, Inc.), 432 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010). The debtor disclosed in
its schedules that it held title to a $120 million pooled investment account (“the PIA”), $45
million of which was property of the estate, and the balance was subject to a trust in favor of
thirty-one parish depositors, albeit without an express trust agreement. Id. at 143. The
committee challenged the validity of the trust under Delaware law. The bankruptcy court held
that under Delaware law, the investment account was subject to a resulting trust in favor of
the parish depositors. Id. at 148 (noting that the relationship between the parish depositors
and the debtor was analogous to that between investor and broker); see also E. Lake Methodist
Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Trs. of the Peninsula-Del. Annual Conference, 731 A.2d 798, 809
(Del. 1999) (holding that, even without an express trust agreement, the diocese held
investment funds delivered to it by parishes in a “resulting trust” so that the funds were not
property of the estate). Under bankruptcy law, however, because the Wilmington parishes’
deposits were commingled with property of the estate and untraceable, the entire $120 million
PIA was property of the estate free and clear. See In re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, 432
B.R. at 149–50, 158–61. In contrast, in the Milwaukee case, the Fund was a parish-only
investment account segregated from any diocesan funds, so that the parishes could easily trace
their property interests in it. See In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. at 863–64.
128
In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. at 870.
129
See id. at 871.
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challenge, known as the “Cemetery Trust” litigation, became the subject of
fierce and protracted litigation through appeal to the Seventh Circuit.130 The
committee sought to avoid as fraudulent a pre-petition transfer by the
Archdiocese of about $55 million to an express trust known as the Cemetery
Trust (“the Trust”). The Archdiocese owned eight Catholic cemeteries and
seven mausoleums in the Milwaukee area since 1857. For decades before
its bankruptcy, it held an investment account known as the Cemetery Fund
to maintain its cemeteries. In 2007, less than a year after settling a group of
sexual abuse claims for $17 million, the Archdiocese created the Cemetery
Trust to provide for maintenance of the cemetery property.131 In March
2008, with approval from the Pope, the Archbishop transferred about $55
million from the Cemetery Fund into the Cemetery Trust.132 The transfer
was plainly part of a strategy to shield the funds from archdiocesan creditors.
In a 2008 letter to the Holy See requesting approval for the transfer, the
Archbishop wrote that “[b]y transferring these assets to the Trust, I foresee
an improved protection of these funds from any legal claim and liability.”133
The transfer to the Cemetery Trust provided sexual abuse creditors a
much better chance at obtaining derivative standing than their previous
attempt. Unlike the multiple transfers from the pooled investment account
to various parish depositors, the transfer from the Archdiocese to the
Cemetery Trust presented a single $55 million transfer to a single transferee.
Moreover, the Archbishop made the transfer with the express intention, as
he explained to the Pope, to shield cash from the impending claims of sexual
abuse claimants.
The committee’s challenge to the $55 million Cemetery Trust transfer
put the Archbishop in an unusual situation. In his capacity as trustee of the
Cemetery Trust, he was the transferee. In his capacity as archbishop, he was
the agent for the transferor. The Archdiocese, as debtor in possession, had
no incentive to assert its transfer-avoiding powers against the Archbishop to
avoid the transfer to the Trust.134 To rectify this conflict, with the agreement
of the parties, the bankruptcy court granted the sexual abuse creditors’

130

See Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015).
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee),
485 B.R. 385, 387 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2013), rev’d, 496 B.R. 905 (E.D. Wis. 2013), rev’d and
remanded, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015).
132
Id.
133
Listecki, 780 F.3d at 734. The Archdiocese explained that the transfer was not an
“actual fraud” intended to hinder its creditors, but rather a formalization of the trust for the
perpetual care of cemeteries under which the Archdiocese had always held the funds that were
transferred in 2008 into the Cemetery Trust. See Archdiocese Clarifies 7th Circuit Court
Ruling, supra note 111.
134
See In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 485 B.R. at 387.
131
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committee derivative standing.135 The Cemetery Trust litigation proceeded
with the Archbishop and the committee at odds as to the Archbishop’s
protection from avoidance on religious liberty grounds as discussed below
in Part V.
3. Substantive Consolidation
In the Saint Paul and Minneapolis case, sexual abuse creditors tried to
augment the debtor’s estate not by challenging individual transfers from the
debtor to parishes, but rather by dismantling the legal distinction between the
debtor and the separately incorporated parishes. Seventeen months after the
case commenced, the sexual abuse creditors’ committee moved for
substantive consolidation of the debtor with about 200 separately
incorporated entities including 187 parishes, none of which were debtors in
bankruptcy.136
The district court held that substantive consolidation of the debtor with
separately incorporated, non-debtor parishes would be inconsistent with §
303(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits commencement of an
involuntary bankruptcy case against a non-profit corporation.137 The Eighth
Circuit similarly held in favor of the debtor.138 Section 105 only confers
equitable powers that do not conflict with an explicit mandate of another
provision of the Bankruptcy Code.139 Substantive consolidation would, in
effect, force parishes into involuntary bankruptcy and would violate § 303(a)
which expressly protects non-profit organizations (like parishes) from

135

Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee),
496 B.R. 905, 916–17 (E.D. Wis. 2013), rev’d, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015); see also In re
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 485 B.R. at 391 (“The Committee, acting derivatively through the
Debtor as debtor in possession, is defending a lawsuit concerning property of the bankruptcy
estate.”).
136
See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul &
Minneapolis (In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis), 888 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir.
2018). Bankruptcy courts can order substantive consolidation of a debtor with other legally
distinct entities as an exercise of their general equitable power under § 105. 11 U.S.C. §
105(a) (2018) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”). See generally, TABB, supra note 65, at
242.
137
See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul &
Minneapolis, 562 B.R. 755, 762–63 (D. Minn. 2016) (describing substantive consolidation as
“effectively involuntary bankruptcy” for the non-debtors), aff’d, 888 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2018);
see also 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2018). The circuit court also affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
finding that, even if the court had authority to order substantive consolidation under § 105,
the facts did not support it. See Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 562 B.R. at 763–64
(applying Eighth Circuit precedent on substantive consolidation as set forth in in First Nat’l
Bank of El Dorado v. Giller (In re Giller), 962 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1992)).
138
See In re Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 888 F.3d at 954.
139
Id. at 952.
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involuntary bankruptcy.140
The Eighth Circuit “le[ft] for another day” the question of whether a
bankruptcy court could order substantive consolidation of a debtor with a
non-profit non-debtor if the latter was an alter ego or otherwise not entitled
to be treated as legally distinct from the debtor under state law.141 The
committee had asserted that the parishes were legally indistinct from the
Archdiocese based on the Archbishop’s supervisory role over parishes under
canon law and the provisions of Minnesota law governing religious
corporations which expressly recognized the role of the Archbishop in
organizing and operating parish corporations.142 The court found that the
committee did not allege facts that could support disregard of the separate
incorporation of the parishes under Minnesota law. Even if an alter ego
theory under state law was viable for substantive consolidation of non-profit
non-debtors, the committee had not alleged facts sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss.143
IV. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
A. The First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Debtors defended against sexual abuse claimants’ efforts to expand
property of the estate by asserting protection from the application of certain
aspects of bankruptcy law under the First Amendment and RFRA. Like the
litigation over property of the estate, the legal contexts in which religious
liberty issues arose depended on organizational structure, title to property,
and property transfers unique to each debtor.
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v.
Smith,144 the Court applied the First Amendment to protect against
imposition of a substantial burden on religious expression unless the
government could show that the burden was necessary to serve a compelling
governmental interest.145 In Smith, the Court held the Free Exercise Clause
does not protect against enforcement of “neutral, generally applicable
law[s]” that impose a substantial burden on religious expression even when
those laws are not “justified by a compelling governmental interest.”146
140

Id.
Id. at 953.
142
Id. at 948–49.
143
Id. at 953.
144
494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4
(2018)), as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015).
145
See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
146
494 U.S. at 890; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 694
141
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In 1990, Congress enacted RFRA to supersede the Supreme Court’s
decision in Smith.147 Under RFRA, “[g]overnment shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability.”148 The general prohibition on substantial burden
on the exercise of religion under RFRA is subject to an exception that
permits “[g]overnment” to substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion if it demonstrates that “application of the burden to the person (1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”149
Under either First Amendment doctrine or RFRA, a party seeking protection
from government enforcement of a neutral, generally applicable law must
show that enforcement of that law imposes a substantial burden on the
exercise of religion.150
B. The Bankruptcy Code as Neutral, Generally Applicable Law
In the Cemetery Trust litigation in the Milwaukee case, Archbishop
Jerome Listecki sought declaratory judgment on his religious liberty defense
under RFRA to the committee’s action by derivative standing to avoid the
$55 million Cemetery Trust Transfer as a fraudulent transfer.151 The
Archbishop conceded that the Bankruptcy Code was a law of general
application, but he contended that it was not “neutral” to religion because it
(2014) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997)).
147
See § 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1) (noting that the Supreme Court in Smith “virtually
eliminated” the compelling interest test, and that one of the purposes of RFRA was to restore
the compelling interest test as set forth in Verner and Yoder); see also Gonzales v. Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (recounting the history of
RFRA as Congressional action to supersede Smith). RFRA does not apply to the states. See
§ 2000bb-2 (providing that RFRA applies only to the United States, its territories and
possessions, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico); see also Flores, 521 U.S. at 534
(holding an earlier version of RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states). Thirty-three
states have either enacted similar state legislation or interpreted their state constitutions to
require a heightened level of judicial scrutiny for state government action that imposes a
burden on free expression of religion. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the
Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 844–45 nn.22 & 26 (2014) (citing to state legislation
and court decisions).
148
§ 2000bb-1(a).
149
Id. § 2000bb-1(b). Subsection 1(c) provides for relief “against a government.” Id. §
2000bb-1(c).
150
See id. § 2000bb-1(a); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531–32 (1993) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect against application
of a neutral, generally applicable law that has only an incidental effect on exercise of religious
beliefs); Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 860 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005)
(providing that RFRA puts the burden on the person who invokes it to show the neutral law
imposes a substantial burden).
151
See Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir.
2015).
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contains three subsections which recognize exceptions from a general
transfer avoidance rule for certain transfers to charitable or religious
transferees.152 Particularly, the Archbishop argued that these subsections are
“religious” under Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah153
because they “refer[] to a religious practice [i.e., charitable or religious
contributions] without a secular meaning discernible from the language or
context.”154 The Seventh Circuit rejected the Archbishop’s contention
because the exceptions from avoidance for certain charitable contributions
do not prohibit the practice of religion, but rather encourage it and thus do
not implicate the First Amendment.155 Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code
provisions that establish property of the estate apply without regard to
religion or religious beliefs.156
C. Substantial Burden on Free Exercise of Religion
As to whether application of bankruptcy law governing property of the
estate substantially burdens Catholic debtors’ free exercise of religion, a
recurring consideration was the choice of the debtor to seek relief in
bankruptcy. In the Portland case, the bankruptcy court noted that the
debtor’s choice to organize as a corporation sole and to hold record title to
property, including property attributed to parishes under canon law, was the
cause of its problems, not application of the Bankruptcy Code. The court
noted that, “[i]f a religious organization’s manner of holding property fails
under neutral civil law to protect its internal view of property ownership, but
such internal view could have been accommodated by civil law, the burden
on the exercise of religion is caused not by the neutral law but by the religious
organization’s own choice.”157
Similarly, in the Spokane case, the bankruptcy court reasoned that,
because the debtors chose the benefits of bankruptcy, they could not
legitimately complain that the statutory constraints that come with it imposed

152
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2018) (providing an exception from fraudulent
transfer avoidance for certain charitable contributions); id. § 548(d)(4) (defining qualified
charitable contributions); id. § 544(b)(2) (providing an analogous protection for certain
charitable contributions from avoidance under state fraudulent transfer law).
153
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
154
Listecki, 780 F.3d at 743 (alteration in original omitted); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at
533–34.
155
Listecki, 780 F.3d at 744.
156
See id. The Seventh Circuit identified the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that
together establish “property of the estate” including § 541 (defining “property of the estate”)
and the avoiding powers by which the trustee augments the estate. Id. at 743.
157
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. at 862. “It is not for
the civil courts to enforce canon law if the actions of the religious organization under
applicable civil law do not effectuate what canon law requires.” Id.
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a substantial burden on their free exercise right.158 “It is not a burden on a
religious organization which voluntarily seeks the protection of the
bankruptcy laws to require it to treat its creditors in the same manner as any
other debtor.”159 If the debtor found the application of bankruptcy law to be
a burden on its religious liberty, “the appropriate remedy would be dismissal
of the bankruptcy case.”160
In the Portland case, the bankruptcy court delivered a small victory to
the debtor. The court considered whether exercise of the trustee’s power
under § 544(a)(3) to avoid parishes’ unrecorded beneficial interests in all
real property could substantially burden the debtor’s free exercise of
religious belief.161 It held that parishioners’ complete loss of access to places
for Catholic worship and education could be a substantial burden on the
exercise of religion for purposes of the application of RFRA.162 This
possibility raised an issue of fact precluding summary judgment in favor of
the committee.163
Because the bankruptcy court in the Portland case held that avoidance
under § 544(a)(3) of all unrecorded parish interests in real property could
substantially burden exercise of religion, it reached the question of whether
the government’s interest in the enforcement of the trustee’s power under §
544(a)(3) was compelling. It grappled with the purpose of § 544(a)(3): “It
gives to the bankruptcy trustee . . . the ability to avoid certain interests in real
property that would not be avoidable under state law if there were no actual
bona fide purchaser of real property.”164 A few paragraphs later, the court
described the purpose of the avoiding powers generally to “maximize the
bankruptcy estate and . . . the recovery for creditors.”165 The court observed
that the Bankruptcy Code provides for exceptions that do not further this
158

Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of
Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 324 n.5 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part sub nom. Comm. of
Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-0274-JLQ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6025 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006), and rev’d in part sub nom. Comm. of Tort Litigants v.
Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006). The bankruptcy court noted
that “[b]ankruptcy debtors who voluntarily choose to participate in that statutory scheme, even
those of a religious nature, should not be able to ‘pick and choose’ among Code sections.” Id.
159
Id. at 325.
160
Id. at 324 n.5.
161
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. at 863–64. The debtor
argued that wholesale avoidance of parishes’ beneficial interests would result in the loss to
parishioners of access to places for religious worship and education. Id. at 859.
162
Id. at 863. “The possibility that the result of the [sexual abuse claimants’] § 544(a)(3)
claim could be the loss of all parish church and Archdiocesan school properties titled in the
debtor’s name raises a question of fact regarding whether application of § 544(a)(3) would
impose a substantial burden on the parishioners’ exercise of religion.” Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 864.
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policy and concluded that the government’s interest in enforcement of §
544(a)(3) in this circumstance would not be compelling.166
D. The Cemetery Trust Litigation
In the Cemetery Trust litigation in the Milwaukee case, the Archbishop
argued that the committee’s exercise (by derivative standing) of the trustee’s
fraudulent transfer avoiding power would impose a substantial burden on the
free exercise of religion, against which RFRA protected him, absent a
compelling governmental interest.167 The Archbishop argued that exercise
of fraudulent transfer avoiding powers to recapture the corpus of the
Cemetery Trust for the estate would interfere with his canonical obligation
to maintain cemetery property as consecrated Catholic burial grounds.168 It
would also divert funds intended by the faithful for cemetery maintenance to
payment of sexual abuse claims, inconsistently with canon law which
requires donations to be applied as the donors intend.169 Both effects would
substantially burden the Archbishop’s exercise of religion as protected under
the First Amendment and RFRA.170
1. Avoidance Actions as Action by the “Government” under
RFRA
The committee responded to the Archbishop’s RFRA defense by
raising a statutory interpretation issue under RFRA that the parties in the
Spokane and Portland cases had not raised. It asserted that RFRA applies
only to actions by the “government,” the committee was not the
“government,” and therefore, RFRA did not apply to protect the Archbishop
at all.171
RFRA defines “government” to include a “branch, department, agency,
instrumentality and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the
United States.”172 The committee contended that the committee, in its
capacity as an official committee in a bankruptcy case, exercising the
trustee’s fraudulent transfer avoiding power via derivative standing, was not
166

Id.
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2015).
168
Id.; see also Corrected Response Brief of Appellee at 6–8, Listecki v. Official Comm.
of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-2881) [hereinafter Appellee’s
Corrected Brief].
169
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee),
496 B.R. 905, 911 (E.D. Wis. 2013), rev’d, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015); see also 1983 CODE
C.1267, § 3 (providing that offerings given by the faithful for a particular purpose may be
applied only for that purpose).
170
See Listecki, 780 F.3d at 735.
171
Id. at 736.
172
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (2018).
167
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“acting under color of law” so as to constitute the “government” for purposes
of triggering RFRA protection.173
Nearly two decades earlier, when the Eighth Circuit in In re Young174
considered whether RFRA protected a church from a Chapter 7 trustee’s
fraudulent transfer action, the parties did not dispute whether the Chapter 7
trustee was the “government” for purposes of RFRA protection, and the court
did not address it. The Eighth Circuit noted only that “[t]he bankruptcy code
is federal law, the federal courts are a branch of the United States, and our
decision in the present case would involve the implementation of federal
bankruptcy law.”175
The Seventh Circuit in Listecki concluded that RFRA applied only to
“government” action.176 It recognized a distinction on this point between
RFRA protection and protection under the First Amendment, which provides
protection against a lawsuit initiated by a private party.177 As to whether the
committee was the “government,” the Seventh Circuit noted that the phrase
“under color of law” in the definition of “government” in RFRA should be
interpreted consistently with the term “under color of [law]” in § 1983.178 A
private person who acts “under color of law” is a governmental actor.179
Whether a person acts “under color of law” depends on the presence of a
“close nexus between the State and the challenged action” such that the
action “may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”180
The Archbishop argued that the committee was the “government” for
RFRA purposes because as an official committee appointed by the United
States Trustee, it was a “government-created, government-supervised,
173

Listecki, 780 F.3d at 736.
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1420 (8th
Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
175
Id. at 1417.
176
Listecki, 780 F.3d at 737; see also § 2000bb-1(a) (“Government shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided . . . .”); id. § 2000bb-2(1) (“[T]he term ‘government’
includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting
under color of law) of the United States, or of a covered entity.”).
177
Listecki, 780 F.3d at 741.
178
Id. at 738; see also 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2018) (“Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia . . . .”); Tanvir v. Tanzin, 889 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting that Congress
intended for courts to apply the meaning of “under color of law” from § 1983 when construing
the term “government” as used in RFRA), amended and superseded by 894 F.3d 449 (2d Cir.
2018).
179
See Listecki, 780 F.3d at 737.
180
Id. at 738 (citation omitted). In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Court held that
conduct is under color of law for purposes of § 1983 when the conduct is “the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the [s]tate . . . or by a person for whom the [s]tate is
responsible,” and when the actor “may fairly be said to be a state actor.” 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982).
174
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government-empowered, statutorily protected entity.”181 Moreover, the
committee acted “under color of law” by exercising, via derivative standing,
the trustee’s statutory avoiding powers, which are “exclusively held by a
public actor.”182 The creditors’ committee argued that it was representing
the private, non-governmental interests of sexual abuse claimants and
therefore was not the “government.” 183
The Seventh Circuit rejected both of the Archbishop’s arguments and
held in favor of the committee.184 It held that an official creditors’ committee
is not a government actor even though the U.S. Trustee’s office appoints it
and monitors its activities as part of the Trustee’s responsibility to supervise
a bankruptcy case.185 Rather, the committee was “a combination of private
decisions, United States Trustee appointment, and court supervision, with
private actions providing the qualifying criteria for appointment.”186 The
court drew an analogy between the role of a committee in a bankruptcy case
and a public defender in a criminal case.187 “Although some of [the
committee’s] activities are subject to governmental and court supervision, its
core function is to act on behalf of, and advance the undivided interest of, its
clients, namely the private creditors.”188
The analogy the court drew is inapt. Although a bankruptcy trustee in
a Chapter 7 case is typically an individual, he or she does not represent any
private interests, or hold a private interest in the case apart from
compensation for services rendered as trustee.189 The Bankruptcy Code
provides that the “estate” is a separate and distinct legal entity from the
debtor or any of its creditors.190 The district court has exclusive jurisdiction

181

Appellee’s Corrected Brief, supra note 168, at 17; see also Listecki, 780 F.3d at 782.
Appellee’s Corrected Brief, supra note 168, at 23 (citing Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1420 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521
U.S. 1114 (1997)).
183
Listecki, 780 F.3d at 737–38.
184
Id. at 738.
185
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(E) (2018).
186
Listecki, 780 F.3d at 738. The court noted that once appointed, a committee “takes on
a life of its own” independent of the government. Id. at 739. It can retain counsel and obtain
compensation from the estate, not the government, although the “[t]rustee can weigh in, and
the court has input” on the attorney client relationship and fees. Id.
187
Id. at 740–41 (citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1981)).
188
Id. at 741 (citations omitted).
189
See 11 U.S.C. § 326(a) (2018) (noting that “the court may allow reasonable
compensation . . . for the trustee’s services” not to exceed certain percentages of the “moneys
disbursed or turned over in the case by the trustee to parties in interest”); id. § 701 (providing
that “the United State’s trustee shall appoint” an interim trustee who is a “disinterested
person” in a chapter 7 case); id. § 1106(a) (same in a chapter 11 case).
190
Id. § 541(a) (providing that commencement of a case “creates an estate . . . comprised
of all of the following property, wherever located and by whomever held”).
182
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over property of the estate.191 Unlike a public defender who represents a
non-governmental criminal defendant, the bankruptcy trustee acts solely as
representative for the estate.192 The Bankruptcy Code describes some of the
trustee’s avoiding powers as coextensive with the rights of certain
hypothetical private creditors under state law. For example, the trustee’s
“strong arm” powers to avoid certain unrecorded liens are expressed as
coextensive with the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor or bona fide
purchaser of real property under non-bankruptcy law.193 That the
Bankruptcy Code sometimes defines the limits of the trustee’s avoiding
powers as analogous to those of certain hypothetical private creditors does
not change the trustee into an individual creditor nor does it not affect the
trustee’s essential function as a disinterested agent for the estate.194
The court similarly dismissed the Archbishop’s assertion that the
committee’s derivative standing to assert the rights of the bankruptcy trustee
made it the “government” for RFRA purposes without addressing the merits
of his argument. The court concluded that because the Archbishop had
agreed to derivative standing for the committee to resolve his conflict as both
agent for the debtor/transferor and trustee of the Cemetery Trust/transferee,
the committee’s exercise of avoiding powers by derivative standing was the
result of “private ordering” not exercise of governmental powers.195
2. Compelling Governmental Interest
Before the appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the district court had reached
the compelling governmental interest issue because unlike the Seventh
Circuit, the district court had held that the committee was the government
191
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2018) (“The district court in which a case under title 11 is
commenced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction (1) of all the property, wherever
located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the
estate . . . .”); see also Henry J. Sommer & Richard Levin, 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
¶ 541.01 (16th ed. 2017) (“The estate, which comes into existence when a petition under
section 301, 302, or 303 is filed, consists of all property that will be subject to the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court.”).
192
See § 323(a).
193
See § 544(a)(1) (judicial lien creditor); id. § 544(a)(3) (bona fide purchaser of real
property).
194
In support of its conclusion that the creditors’ committee exercising the trustee’s
powers by derivative standing was not the “government,” the court cited to State Bank of
Toulon v. Covey (In re Duckworth), 776 F.3d 453, 458 (7th Cir. 2014), noting in a
parenthetical only that an “individual trustee” in that case attempted to avoid a transfer.
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d at 740. In In re Duckworth, the
court held that a chapter 7 trustee asserting the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor under §
544(a)(1) is not subject to parol evidence regarding a mistaken date in a security agreement.
It held that § 544(a)(1) makes it clear that the trustee’s position exercising the rights of a
hypothetical judicial lien creditor is “different” than that of a private creditor.
195
Id. at 739. For a criticism of this conclusion, see infra text accompanying notes 261–
65.
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for purposes of RFRA.196 Because RFRA applied to the committee’s action,
the district court considered whether the committee’s exercise of fraudulent
transfer avoiding powers would substantially burden the Archbishop’s
exercise of religion. It concluded that it would and that the government
lacked a compelling interest that could justify such a burden.197
Recall that years earlier, the bankruptcy court in the Portland case
considered the debtor’s argument that RFRA protected it from exercise
(derivatively by the committee) of the trustee’s power to avoid parishes
unrecorded interests in real property under § 544(a)(3). It did not address
the contention that the committee exercising these powers would not be the
“government” for RFRA purposes because the parties did not raise it. The
court in that case reached the same conclusion as the district court in the
Cemetery Trust litigation, that the burden on the debtor from avoiding the
parishes’ property interests would be substantial and the government’s
interest in enforcement of § 544(a)(3) was not compelling.198
As explained above, when the Cemetery Trust litigation reached the
Seventh Circuit, the court held that, because the committee was not the
“government,” RFRA did not apply. Nonetheless, it reached the issue of
whether the government’s interest was compelling as part of its analysis of
whether the First Amendment protected the Archbishop. For purposes of
First Amendment protection, and notwithstanding Smith, Seventh Circuit
precedent required the court to consider whether a neutral law of general
application would “substantially burden” free exercise of religion, and if so
whether a compelling government interest justified that burden.199 The court
held that, even assuming avoidance of the Cemetery Trust transfer would
substantially burden the Archbishop’s exercise of religion, bankruptcy law
furthers a compelling governmental interest.200
The committee had asserted that the compelling governmental interest
in enforcement of the fraudulent transfer avoiding power was “protection of
creditors.”201 The Seventh Circuit adopted this assertion enthusiastically.
196
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee),
496 B.R. 905, 917 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (“[T]he pursuit of claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate
is a traditional public function.”), rev’d, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015).
197
Id. at 921–22.
198
Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of
Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 325 n.5 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part sub nom. Comm. of
Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-0274-JLQ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6025 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006), and rev’d in part sub nom. Comm. of Tort Litigants v.
Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006); see also supra text
accompanying notes 154–62.
199
See Listecki, 780 F.3d at 745 (citing Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d
975, 996 (7th Cir. 2006)).
200
Id. at 745–46.
201
Id. at 745.
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“[T]he importance of protecting the interests of creditors is readily
apparent.”202 As support for its conclusion, the court offered an assortment
of anecdotes about the political and economic significance of bankruptcy
law. It cited cases that noted the history of federal bankruptcy law, none of
which addressed the federal government’s interest in enforcement of the
Bankruptcy Code in general or the trustee’s fraudulent transfer avoiding
powers in particular.203 The court undermined its conclusion with two
references. First, it cited United States v. Whiting Pools,204 in which the
Court noted that bankruptcy reorganization furthers a variety of
governmental interests apart from protecting creditors, including
preservation of the going-concern value of the debtor, jobs for its employees,
and a return on investment for shareholders.205 Second, the Seventh Circuit
cited to United States v. Lee, in which the Court held that the government’s
interest in enforcement of social security taxation law is compelling.206 The
Seventh Circuit noted that the social security system “aids those who have
reached a certain age or are disabled,” whereas, the Bankruptcy Code “aids
those who have reached a certain financial condition and who need
assistance repaying or recovering a debt.”207 The Seventh Circuit’s analogy
between the Bankruptcy Code and the social security system supports the
conclusion that the government’s compelling interest in the Bankruptcy
Code is to offer relief to debtors, not creditors.
The Seventh Circuit clearly expressed its disagreement with the Eighth
Circuit’s contrary holding in In re Young.208 Before In re Young, courts were
divided as to whether the Bankruptcy Code presented a compelling
202

Id. at 747.
See id. at 745–46; see also Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 365–69 (2006)
(discussing the history of U.S. bankruptcy laws and support for inclusion of the Bankruptcy
Clause in the Constitution to permit the federal government to provide a uniform law for
insolvency and discharge); id. at 372 (avoidance of preferential transfers has long been a “core
aspect” of bankruptcy law); Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (the Bankruptcy
Act prohibited discharge of claims based on fraud); BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S.
531, 540–41 (1994) (history of fraudulent transfer laws); Beiger v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58
(1990) (avoidance powers further the “central policy” of “[e]quality of distribution among
creditors”); In re River W. Plaza-Chi., LLC, 664 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A central
purpose of bankruptcy . . . is to maximize creditor recovery.”) (quoting Corp. Assets, Inc. v.
Paloian, 368 F.3d 761, 767 (7th Cir. 2004)).
204
462 U.S. 198 (1983).
205
See Listecki, 780 F3d. at 746 (citing Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203). The two
purposes of § 541 are protecting creditors and permitting the debtor to “carry on and rebuild.”
Id. at 747 (citing Andrews v. Riggs Nat’l Bank (In re Andrews), 80 F.3d 906, 909 (4th Cir.
1996)).
206
455 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1982).
207
Listecki, 780 F.3d at 746.
208
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1420 (8th
Cir. 1996) (holding that “allowing debtors a fresh start and protecting the interests of creditors
are not compelling governmental interests under RFRA”), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
203
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governmental interest that could justify a substantial burden imposed on a
debtor’s free exercise of religion.209 In In re Young, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
trustee for an individual debtor brought a fraudulent transfer action against a
church transferee for tithes the debtor had made to his church in the year
before he filed for bankruptcy.210 The church transferee asserted that RFRA
protected it from avoidance.211 The Eighth Circuit held in favor of the
church. RFRA protected the church from application of the trustee’s
avoiding powers because exercise of the trustee’s power would substantially
impair exercise of religion, and the trustee had not established that avoidance
of the tithes furthered a compelling government interest.212 The Eighth
Circuit stated its view: “[W]e cannot see how the recognition of what is in
effect a free exercise exception to the avoidance of fraudulent transfers can
undermine the integrity of the bankruptcy system as a whole; its effect will
necessarily be limited to the debtor’s creditors, who will as a result have
fewer assets available.”213
The Seventh Circuit dismissed the Eighth Circuit’s analysis in In re
Young as “cursory” and criticized it for failing to consider “the importance
of the [Bankruptcy] Code in Supreme Court precedent, our nation’s history,
or the effect it has on debtors and creditors.”214 It adopted the conclusion of
the dissenting opinion in In re Young that enforcement of the Bankruptcy
Code as a whole “furthers the compelling governmental interest in . . .
209
See Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239, 251–52
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) (holding that the government’s interest in avoiding tithes to the
debtor’s church as fraudulent transfers was compelling); In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 353
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that protection of legitimate interests of creditors is a
compelling governmental interest). But see In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396, 405 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1995) (holding that the exercise of avoiding powers to expand the estate for creditors is not a
compelling interest).
210
82 F.3d at 1410. The trustee argued that the tithes were transfers made “for less than
reasonably equivalent value” while the debtor was insolvent, and were thus avoidable under
§ 548 as constructively fraudulent. Id. at 1414.
211
Id. at 1417.
212
Id. at 1420.
213
Id. In 1998, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code expressly to exclude certain prepetition charitable and religious contributions by debtors to religious organization from
fraudulent transfer avoidance in the donor’s bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)
(1998) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (2018)). The 1998 amendments also preclude
a court from considering a debtor’s qualifying charitable contributions for purposes of
calculating his means to pay creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (1998) (current version at 11
U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2018)). The amendments treat qualifying charitable contributions as
“reasonably necessary” expenses for purposes of determining the “disposable income”
available to pay creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)–(3) (2018).
214
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 747 (7th Cir. 2015).
The court described as “without explanation” the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that the
government’s interest in creditor protection in the Bankruptcy Code is distinguishable from
the government’s interest in national security or public safety and therefore not compelling.
Id.
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protecting the interests of creditors by maximizing the debtor’s estate.”215
Moreover, it held that the Bankruptcy Code is “narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest.”216
The court’s conclusion rests on an absurdly sweeping generalization
about the purpose of bankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Code does not serve
a single governmental purpose for which the government’s interest in
enforcement without exception is always compelling.
Rather, the
Bankruptcy Code endeavors to achieve a balance among a host of sometimes
conflicting governmental goals, including but not limited to maximizing
payout to unsecured creditors.217 For example, the trustee’s power to avoid
fraudulent transfers, the avoiding power at issue in the Cemetery Trust
litigation, does not invalidate every wealth-depleting transfer that reduces
unsecured creditors’ expected payment. Rather, whether the trustee can
avoid a transfer as fraudulent depends on a complicated balance between the
interests of the transferor’s creditors and the interests of the transferee.218
In November 2015, after the committee’s victory before the Seventh
Circuit in the Cemetery Trust litigation, the parties reached a settlement and
confirmed a consensual plan.219 The plan provided for a $21 million fund to

215
Id. at 746 (alteration in original) (quoting Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free
Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1422 (8th Cir. 1996) (Bogue, J., dissenting)), vacated,
521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
216
Id. at 749. The court must look “beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the
general applicability of government mandates and scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting
specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.” Id. at 748 (alteration in original)
(quoting Gonzales v. Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431
(2006)).
217
See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (observing that
“[b]y permitting reorganization, congress anticipated that the business would continue to
provide jobs, to satisfy creditors’ claims, and to produce a return for its owners.”); H.R. REP.
NO. 95-595, p. 220 (1977); see also Henry J. Sommer & Richard Levin, 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (16th ed. 2017) (noting that “any approach to corporate
reorganization must strike a balance between the need of a corporate debtor in financial
hardship to be made economically sound and the desire to preserve creditors’ and
stakeholders’ existing legal rights to the greatest extent possible”).
218
Fraudulent transfer law takes into account the bona fides of the transferee, protecting
the transferee from avoidance in circumstances when the transferee participated in the transfer
for value and in good faith. See § 548(c) (stating that a transferee of an avoidable fraudulent
transfer who takes for value and in good faith has a lien on the transferred property to the
extent of value he gave for the property); BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 536,
545 (1994) (stating that a transferee who acquires property at a non-collusive, regularly
conducted foreclosure sale gives “reasonably equivalent value” and is protected from
fraudulent transfer avoidance under § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) even though the foreclosure sale price
is below the fair market value for the property).
219
See generally Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization Dated September
25, 2015, Proposed by the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No.
11-20059-svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Second Amended Chapter 11
Plan].
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compensate sexual abuse claimants, five times more than the debtor had
proposed in a plan it filed in February 2014.220 The Cemetery Trust
committed to loan the debtor $3 million and contribute $8 million to the
claims settlement fund.221 Insurers provided $11 million. Total professional
fees paid by the estate were approximately $27 million.222 The bankruptcy
court confirmed the consensual plan after concluding that the debtor’s plan
was in creditors’ best interests compared to liquidation.223 Notwithstanding
a favorable outcome for sexual abuse claimants on the Archbishop’s
religious liberty protection before the Seventh Circuit, the odds that the
sexual abuse creditors’ committee could avoid the $55 million Cemetery
Trust transfer under § 544(b) and Wisconsin law were far from certain.
3. Competing Plans and Cram Down
The Saint Paul and Minneapolis case was the first to involve a
competing creditors’ plan and cram down confirmation under § 1129(b). All
previous cases, except San Diego (which was dismissed after settlement),
have concluded with confirmation of a consensual plan.224 While the
substantive consolidation litigation was pending in the Saint Paul and
Minneapolis case, the Archdiocese filed its first plan of reorganization in
May 2016.225 The parties failed to reach a settlement, and after the expiration
of the period in which the debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan in
August 2016, the committee of sexual abuse claimants filed a competing
plan.226
220
Id. at 25–26; see also Annysa Johnson, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Settles Sexual Abuse
Claims for $21 Million, J. SENTINEL (Aug. 4, 2015), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/religio
n/archdiocese-settles-sexual-abuse-claims-for-21-million-b99542352z1-320651132.html/.
221
See Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 219, at 23; see also Rich Kirchen,
Judge OK’s Final Archdiocese of Milwaukee Chapter 11 Plan with $21M to Abuse Victims,
MILWAUKEE BUS. J. (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/news/2015/11/0
9/judge-oks-final-archdiocese-of-milwaukeechapter-11.html.
222
See Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement for the Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan
of Reorganization Dated September 25, 2015, Proposed by the Archdiocese of Milwaukee at
44, In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 11-20059-svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 2015)
[hereinafter Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement].
223
Order Confirming Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization Dated
September 25, 2015, Proposed by the Archdiocese of Milwaukee at 8, In re Archdiocese of
Milwaukee, No. 11-20059-svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Nov. 13, 2015). The Disclosure Statement
explained that the Plan satisfied the best interest test as to sexual abuse claimants because in
a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation, unsecured creditors would receive no distribution unless
the trustee achieved a significant recovery from the Cemetery Trust in fraudulent transfer
avoidance litigation. See Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 222, at 89–96.
224
See infra Appendix B: Outcomes of Cases.
225
See Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul &
Minneapolis, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn.
May 26, 2016).
226
See Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of the Official Committee of Unsecured
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The debtor had settled with eleven of thirteen of its insurers, subject to
court approval of its plan.227 The debtor’s plan provided for a $500,000
counseling fund for sexual abuse claimants and creation of an independent
trust to administer and pay sexual abuse claims.228 The trust included about
$100 million to be contributed by archdiocesan insurers and $30 million by
parishes, parish insurers, and the Archdiocese.229 It provided for discharge
of all tort claims against the Archdiocese and a channeling injunction that
channeled any pre-petition claims against the Archdiocese, the parishes, and
settling insurers, exclusively against the trust.230
The committee’s competing plan similarly created a trust for payment
of sexual abuse claims, but the Archdiocese was required to contribute at
least $99 million.231 The committee would control the trust which would
succeed to the debtor in possession’s transfer avoidance actions against
parishes and its rights against its insurers, nullifying debtor’s conditional
settlements and queueing up years of litigation.232 It did not provide for
immediate discharge of the debtor or the parishes or for a channeling
injunction.233 Ninety-four percent of the members of the class of sexual
abuse claimants voted to reject the debtor’s plan.234

Creditors of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul &
Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016); see also Joint Chapter 11 Plan
of Reorganization of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, In re Archdiocese of Saint
Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. June 28, 2018) [hereinafter Joint
Chapter 11 Plan]. The debtor in a Chapter 11 case has the exclusive right to file a plan of
reorganization during the first 120 days after commencement of the case. See 11 U.S.C. §
1121(b) (2018). If the debtor files a plan during this exclusive period, the debtor has until
180 days after commencement of the case to obtain creditor consent. Id. § 1121(c)(3).
227
First Amended Disclosure Statement for First Amended Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis at 12, In re Archdiocese of
Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2016). Under the plan,
the debtor contributed all of its rights against two of the insurers to the trust and nine in cash.
Id. The Committee conceded that six of the eleven settlements were reasonable and objected
to the remaining five. Id. at 13.
228
Id. at 57.
229
Id. at 2–3, 11.
230
Id. at 100–101; see also First Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of the
Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis at 16–17, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul &
Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2016) [hereinafter First Amended
Chapter 11 Plan].
231
Disclosure Statement for Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of the Official Committee
of Unsecured Creditors of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis at 2, 56–57, C-2, In
re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016).
232
Id. at 23.
233
Id. at 33, 35.
234
See Legal Objection to Confirmation of the Debtor’s Second Amended Chapter 11
Plan of Reorganization at 6, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125
(Bankr. D. Minn. July 1, 2017).
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The committee objected to confirmation of the debtor’s plan on grounds
that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to impose a channeling
injunction protecting parishes (non-debtors) over the objection of the class
of sexual abuse creditors whose claims would be affected.235 The debtor
argued in favor of confirmation of its plan, asserting that without a
channeling injunction including claims against parishes and insurers, no
reorganization would be possible.236
Both sides recognized a split in the circuits on the question of whether
or under what circumstances a bankruptcy court can impose a channeling
injunction without the consent of affected creditors.237 The bankruptcy court
held that it had jurisdiction to order a channeling injunction to protect nondebtors.238 However, the debtor’s plan could not be confirmed absent
“significant acceptance” by the creditors whose claims would be subject to
the channeling injunction.239 Because more than ninety percent of the
members of the class of sexual abuse claimants voted to reject the debtor’s
plan, the requisite “significant acceptance” was lacking.240
The bankruptcy court held that the committee’s plan was “replete with
uncertainties and contingencies that will frustrate the debtor’s effort to

235
Id. at 6 (noting that if the court were to confirm the debtor’s plan including the
channeling injunction protecting non-debtors it would be “the first bankruptcy court in the
country to do anything of the kind”). The committee also argued that absent consent of the
parties, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction in effect to enter a final judgment on sexual
abuse claimants’ state law claims against non-debtors because such matters were not “core
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11.” Id. at 11–12.
236
Omnibus Response to Legal Objections to the Debtor’s Second Amended Chapter 11
Plan of Reorganization at 5, 17–18, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 1530125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2017) (citing In re 710 Long Ridge Rd. Operating Co., No.
13-13653, 2014 WL 886433, at *15–16 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2014) (holding that, because
reorganization would otherwise be impossible, approving injunctions was necessary to protect
the debtor’s key employees notwithstanding claimants’ rejection of the plan)) (“Put simply, a
channeling injunction represents the best and only vehicle for a fair and just global resolution
of claims in this case.”).
237
See Order Denying Confirmation of Debtor’s Plan Dated and Filed on December 19,
2016 at 4–13, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D.
Minn. Dec. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Order Denying Confirmation of Plan] (describing state of
the law among the circuits). The parties agreed that the applicable standard for an injunction
protecting non-debtors was set out by the bankruptcy court in In re Master Mortg. Inv. Fund,
168 B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994). The court should consider five factors: (1) an identity
of interest between the debtor and the third party, e.g. indemnity, such that a suit against the
non-debtor is, in essence, a suit against the debtor or implicating estate assets; (2) the nondebtor has contributed “substantial assets” to the reorganization; (3) the injunction is essential
to reorganization; (4) a “substantial majority” of the impacted class of creditors agrees to such
injunction; and (5) the plan provides a mechanism for the payment of “all, or substantially
all,” of the claims of the impacted class. Id. at 934–35.
238
See Order Denying Confirmation of Plan, supra note 237, at 13–14.
239
Id. at 16.
240
Id.
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reorganize,” and created a long list of issues for litigation and court
resolution as part of the confirmation process.241 Perhaps the most daunting
open issue was a determination of the assets to be included as in property of
the estate and the value of those assets. The bankruptcy court dubbed the
committee’s plan a “plan of future litigation” and a “boon for lawyers” with
no chance of achieving timely payment to creditors and successful
reorganization of the debtor.242
In a joint memorandum denying confirmation of both plans, the
bankruptcy judge expressed his frustration with both parties who failed to
agree on a plan after three years.243 Resolution of the case, the judge wrote,
will require an agreement. The parties and their lawyers “must put aside
their desire to win and decide to put together a resolution that is fair to all
the people involved.”244 In June 2018, the parties reached agreement on a
consensual plan that would provide $210 million for 450 sexual abuse
claimants.245
V. THE LEGACY OF THE CATHOLIC BANKRUPTCY CASES
A. Organization Under Canon Law
In some respects, the Catholic bankruptcies are not unusual among
bankruptcy cases of non-profit organizations.246 The absence of profitseeking stockholders or any market analog to evaluate the effectiveness of
managerial decisions relative to the competition increases risk of loss from
incompetence or fraud.247 All non-profit organizations are prone to
mismanagement notwithstanding the sincerity of their religious beliefs or

241

Order Denying Confirmation of the Committee of Unsecured Creditors’ Plan Dated
and Filed on December 19, 2016 at 23, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No.
15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. Dec. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Order Denying Confirmation].
242
Id. at 25.
243
Joint Memorandum to Orders Denying Confirmation of Plans Filed by the Debtor and
the Creditors Committee at 1, In re Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125
(Bankr. D. Minn. Dec. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Joint Memorandum].
244
Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). The court noted that sexual abuse claimants’ lawyers
may be a source of plan funding. Assuming 33% contingency fees, attorneys’ fees for sexual
abuse claimants’ lawyers would range between $30 and $40 million dollars, a “pretty hefty
sum for completing proofs of claim.” Id. at 3–4.
245
See infra Appendix B: Outcomes of Cases.
246
See Foohey, supra note 11, at 278 (noting that about ninety religious organizations file
petitions under Chapter 11 each year).
247
See Comm. on Budget & Fin., Diocesan Internal Controls: A Framework, U.S. CONF.
http://www.usccb.org/about/financial-reporting/diocesan-internalOF CATH. BISHOPS,
controls-framework.cfm (last visited May 10, 2019) (providing guidelines to alert bishops to
weaknesses in internal controls, risk of embezzlement, and fraudulent financial reporting).
The USCCB has recognized this risk. Id.
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mission.248
Catholic organizations are different from other non-profit organizations
in two respects. First the Catholic bankruptcies have revealed a heightened
vulnerability to mismanagement because of the hierarchical structure of
Catholic organizations under canon law. Relative to congregational
religious organizations, canon law assigns unilateral authority in the bishop
to assign and supervise priests assigned to parishes. But, the bishop is neither
accountable to the pastor or parishioners in the parishes where the priests
serve, nor privy to day to day parish operations. The separation between
authority and the consequences of the exercise of authority increases the risk
of mismanagement, cover up, and resulting tort exposure for Catholic
organizations relative to that of non-hierarchical non-profit organizations.
Second, centralized authority in the bishop of title to parish property,
or centralized supervisory authority in the bishop over separately
incorporated parishes and indirectly over their decentralized property
interests, likely increases the expected value of sexual abuse claims against
Catholic dioceses relative to similar claims against non-hierarchical religious
organizations. Professor Douglas Laycock noted the impact of the Catholic
hierarchical organizational structure on the magnitude of its tort liability. “A
scandal like [the clergy sexual abuse scandal] becomes utterly destructive of
Catholicism in the United States and not of Protestantism in the United States
without regard to differences in the culpability of the conduct.”249
The hierarchical structure of Catholic organizations under canon law
created a paradox in their bankruptcy cases because it departs from the
ordinary democratic corporate governance structure that underlies efficient
loss allocation under organizational law and bankruptcy law. The Catholic
bankruptcy cases opened to public view the fact that Catholic parishes and
the individual Catholics who support them financially are not analogous to
shareholders of the diocese, or even ordinary autonomous donors to a nonhierarchical religious organization.
Catholics do not control the
management of their parishes or their diocese, other than as advisors to the
pastor.250 They can exercise the power of the purse by withholding
248
See John B. Duncan et al., Internal Control Systems in U.S. Churches: An Examination
of the Effects of Church Size and Denomination on Systems of Internal Control, 12 ACCT.
AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 142, 142–43 (1999).
249
Roundtable Discussion: Religious Organizations Filing for Bankruptcy, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 25, 40 (2005) [HEREINAFTER ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION]; SEE ALSO
Transcript of the Dedication Ceremony for the Conrad B. Duberstein Bankruptcy
Courthouse, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (2005). During the roundtable discussion,
Douglas Laycock asserted that “the choice of religious structure is a constitutionally protected
choice.” See Roundtable Discussion, supra at 40.
250
See 1983 CODE C.537 (requiring each parish to have a parish finance council regulated
by “universal law” as well as “by norms issued by the diocesan bishop” which serves to “assist
the pastor in the administration of the goods of the parish”).

REILLY (DO NOT DELETE)

914

6/3/2019 5:02 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:871

contributions. However, use of this tool to discipline ineffective management
is difficult to square with canon law that requires Catholics to support the
Church.251 Catholics can protest bad management by leaving the Church and
there is evidence that Catholics have done so in response to the sex abuse
scandal.252 But abrogation of faith as a monitoring tool is costly relative to
a shareholder’s ability to sell shares in a mismanaged firm.
B. Contribution by Parishes and Parishioners
Sexual abuse claimants organized as creditors’ committees were no
doubt effective in using the tools available to creditors in bankruptcy court
as leverage in plan negotiations outside of the courtroom. Their successes
were all in preliminary skirmishes. No bankruptcy court has entered an order
to avoid a parish’s interest in property, to avoid a property transfer to a
parish, or to disregard the corporate distinction between a parish and a
diocese to which the entities would otherwise be entitled to under state
corporation law.
No doubt all parties in the Catholic bankruptcy cases understood that a
bankruptcy court order approving a trustee’s sale of a Catholic parish church
or school would likely set off an explosion of self-immolating litigation.
Apart from the daunting practical challenge of appraising and marketing
specialized, religious use property given zoning and other limitations on such
property for non-religious use, the Bankruptcy Code requires a non-profit
debtor to comply with any state law restrictions for sale of property under §

251

See id. C.222, § 1 (requiring the faithful to “assist with the needs of the Church so that
the Church has what is necessary for divine worship, for the works of the apostolate and of
charity, and for the decent support of ministers”); see also Elizabeth Fernandez, Catholic
Group Strives to Mend Church / Voice of Faithful Wants Active Laity to Address Clergy
Scandal, S.F. GATE (Feb. 3, 2003), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Catholic-groupstrives-to-mend-church-Voice-of-2636824.php (expressing frustration of the role of the laity
as “pray, pay and obey”).
252
See Angela K. Dills & Rey Hernandez-Julian, Negative Publicity and Catholic
Schools, 50 ECON. INQUIRY 143 (2012) (noting that the negative publicity from the sex abuse
scandal explains about five percent of the decline in the number of Catholic schools in the last
twenty years); Daniel M. Hungerman, Substitution and Stigma: Evidence on Religious
Markets from the Catholic Sex Abuse Scandal, 5 AM. ECON. J. 227 (2013) (noting that the
scandal led to the departure of two million Catholics, generating an estimated three billion
dollars in donations to other religious groups).
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363(b)253 and as a condition to confirmation of a plan of reorganization.254 It
is not clear how a bankruptcy court could order a liquidation sale of religious
property if it were subject to state law transfer restrictions.
Nor is it clear how courts would rule on a religious liberty defense
raised by a Catholic bishop in opposition to a bankruptcy court-ordered sale
of a parish church or school. The bankruptcy cases so far have explored only
the theoretical surface of RFRA or First Amendment protection from transfer
avoidance litigation. Apart from the concern expressed by the bankruptcy
court in Portland over a substantial burden on free exercise of religion upon
loss of all facilities for worship and education, the bankruptcy cases have left
unresolved bankruptcy and religious liberty issues triggered by a courtordered liquidation of parish property used for worship or religious
education.
The focus of litigation in the Catholic bankruptcy cases on parish
property as property of a diocesan debtor’s estate should not obscure the
importance of future contributions of Catholic faithful as a plan-funding
source. Canon law obligates Catholics to support the Church.255 It gives the
bishop authority to tax parishes for ordinary support of the diocese, but
253
11 U.S.C. § 363(d)(1) (2018) (permitting a trustee to “use, sell, or lease property [out
of the ordinary course]” only in accordance with applicable non-bankruptcy law that governs
the transfer of property by a corporation or trust that is a non-profit organization); see also id.
§ 541(f) (2018) (property held by a federal tax exempt debtor may be transferred to a non-tax
exempt debtor only by complying with all “conditions as would apply” if the debtor had not
filed for bankruptcy). See generally Henry J. Sommer & Richard Levin, 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.04 (16th ed. 2017). New York law, for example, prohibits transfer of
substantially all the assets of a non-profit organization unless, among other requirements, the
terms of the transfer are “fair and reasonable to the corporation” and “the purposes of the
corporation or the interests of the members will be promoted” by the transaction. N.Y. NOTFOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511(d) (2018); see also In re HHH Choices Health Plan, LLC, 554
B.R. 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (considering all the circumstances and approving proposed
sale of substantially all the assets of a non-profit debtor under § 363(d)(1)).
254
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(16) (2018) (“All transfers of property under the plan shall be
made in accordance with any applicable provisions of nonbankruptcy law that govern the
transfer of property by a corporation or trust that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial
corporation or trust.”).
255
See 1983 CODE C.222, § 1 (providing that the faithful are “obliged to assist with the
needs of the Church so that the Church has what is necessary for divine worship, for the works
of the apostolate and of charity, and for the decent support of ministers”); id. C.1262 (“The
faithful are to give support to the Church by responding to appeals . . . .”); id. C.1261, § 1
(providing that the faithful are “free to give temporal goods for the benefit of the Church”).
Commentators explain these provisions as directed at secular law that limits the freedom of
the Church to receive donations or of the faithful to donate. NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON
LAW, supra note 19, at 1461 (providing that C.1261, § 1 is understood to be “directed at those,
within or outside the Church, who would seek to deny or discourage such an exercise of
religious liberty,” and asserting that bishops have a right to financial support of the faithful
against interference by civil authority); see also C.1260 (“The Church has an innate right to
require from the Christian faithful those things which are necessary for the purposes proper
to it.”).
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imposes no obligation on the bishop to do so.256 Assessment by dioceses of
parishes is common, however it appears that parishes comply voluntarily
with such assessments.257 Although Catholic bishops certainly expect
Catholic faithful to provide financial support for their dioceses through
parish assessments, this expectation of support is neither the diocese’s
property under secular law, nor as a basis for funding a feasible, confirmable
plan.258
The question of whether a bankruptcy court could compel parishes or
individual members of the Catholic faithful to fund their diocese’s plan of
reorganization arose in the Saint Paul and Minneapolis case. The sexual
abuse creditor’s committee’s plan provided that the diocese would transfer
to a trust established to pay sexual abuse claimants the diocese’s rights to
collect past-due assessments owed to the diocese by the parishes.259 The
parishes objected to confirmation of the committee’s plan, arguing, among
other things, that the Archbishop’s power to assess parishes is not a secular
256
See C.1263. To impose a tax, the bishop must first consult with the diocesan finance
council and presbyteral council. Id. The bishop also has authority to order parishes to take
up a special collection “for specific parochial, diocesan, national, or universal projects.”
C.1266; see also NEW COMMENTARY ON CANON LAW, supra note 19, at 1465 (“A diocesan
bishop who chooses not to use the coercive instrument of taxation in order to meet the needs
of the diocese, but who prefers to rely on free-will offerings in response to fund–raising
appeals, is free to do so.”); Robert L. Kealy, Taxation, Assessments and Extraordinary
Collections, in CHURCH FINANCE HANDBOOK 77, 79 (Kevin E. McKenna et al. eds., 1999).
The bishop may impose an extraordinary tax on parishes and on individual parishioners for
needs out of the ordinary course “in case of grave necessity.” C.1263; see also Matthew J.
Barrett, The Theological Case for Progressive Taxation as Applied to Diocesan Taxes or
Assessments Under Canon Law in the United States 63 JURIST 312, 335 (2003) (noting that a
few bishops have used this authority to tax parishioners to raise revenue to fund an employee
pension plan or for housing for retired priests); THE CANON LAW SOC’Y OF GR. BRIT. & IR.,
supra note 44, at 713 (noting that some bishops have imposed extraordinary taxes to pay
diocesan legal fees in sexual abuse litigation).
257
See, e.g., DIOCESE OF PHOENIX, BISHOP’S ASSESSMENT POLICY (2016) (imposing a
penalty for late payments); DIOCESE OF SAULT SAINTE MARIE, POLICY NO. 2: DIOCESAN
ADMINISTRATION EXPENSE (2016) (noting that the assessment “is payable at the end of each
month”); The Process and Use of Parish Assessments, CATH. DIOCESE OF CLEVELAND,
https://www.dioceseofcleveland.org/offices/finance/report-to-the-community/the-processand-use-of-parish-assessments (last visited May 10, 2019) (noting “[e]ach parish is expected
to remit their assessment to the Diocese in a timely fashion over the course of the fiscal year”).
258
See § 1129(a)(11); see also In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., No.
04-37154, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1180, at *24 (Bankr. D. Or. Apr. 13, 2007) (“Feasibility has
been defined as whether the things which are to be done after confirmation can be done as a
practical matter under the facts.” (quoting In re Jorgensen, 66 B.R. 104, 108 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1986)). A plan funded primarily by future donations raises a concern about its feasibility.
See, e.g., Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) All., Inc. v. WSI (II)-COS, LLC (In re Save Our Spring
(S.O.S.) All., Inc.), 632 F.3d 168, 172–73 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that a plan funded
exclusively by donations was not feasible); In re Indian Nat’l Finals Rodeo Inc., 453 B.R.
387, 402 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2011).
259
Joint Chapter 11 Plan, supra note 226, at 56; see also First Amended Chapter 11 Plan,
supra note 230, § 5.2(e)(3).
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legal right, not property of the estate, and not an appropriate source of
funding for a feasible plan.260
The bankruptcy court agreed with the parishes. It concluded that a
bishop’s authority to assess parishes is not a legal right and therefore is not
property of the debtor’s estate under § 541.261 In a memorandum
accompanying the order dismissing both plans and relegating the parties to
resume negotiation, however, the court admonished parishes that they “must
consider the possibility of contributing something” to compensate sexual
abuse claimants as part of a consensual plan. “The fact that the abuse may
not be the legal responsibility of the parishes. . . is hardly the point, any more
than their work to help the hungry and homeless are motivated by legal
responsibilities.”262
C. Religious Liberty for Debtors
Courts that have considered Catholic debtors’ religious liberty defenses
to the application of bankruptcy law have overwhelmingly rejected them. A
recurring judicial reaction to debtors’ arguments was that having chosen
bankruptcy, Catholic dioceses and institutes must leave their religious status
at the courthouse door. In the Spokane case, the bankruptcy court observed,
“Bankruptcy debtors who voluntarily choose to participate in that statutory
scheme, even those of a religious nature, should not be able to ‘pick and
choose’ among Code sections.”263 In the Portland case, the bankruptcy court
suggested that a party for whom application of § 541 would impose a
substantial burden on religious expression does not need to assert the First
Amendment to protect itself. It can simply forgo the benefits of a bankruptcy
proceeding.264 In the Cemetery Trust litigation in the Milwaukee case, the
Seventh Circuit noted that the Archdiocese knew of and voluntarily
undertook the costs associated with filing for bankruptcy, including loss of
control over property of the estate.265 The court went so far as to assert that
260
Objection of the Official Committee of Parish Creditors to Confirmation of the
Chapter 11 Plan of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors at 1–3, 5, In re Archdiocese
of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, No. 15-30125 (Bankr. D. Minn. June 7, 2017).
261
Order Denying Confirmation, supra note 241, at 19.
262
Joint Memorandum, supra note 243, at 3.
263
Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of
Spokane), 329 B.R. 304, 324 n.5 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d in part sub nom. Comm. of
Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. CV-05-0274-JLQ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6025 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006), and rev’d in part sub nom. Comm. of Tort Litigants v.
Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 364 B.R. 81 (E.D. Wash. 2006).
264
Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or. (In re Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.), 335 B.R. 842, 853 n.9 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005) (stating
that if the First Amendment protected the debtor from application of the bankruptcy code, the
proper remedy “might well be dismissal of the case”).
265
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 747 (7th Cir. 2015).
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the Archdiocese’s choice to file for Chapter 11 relief was evidence of the
government’s “significant interest” in the enforcement of bankruptcy
laws.266
We are left with a thin and confusing record that offers little guidance
on key issues. The Seventh Circuit in Listecki made it clear that it decided
only that the Archbishop was not entitled to protection from the committee’s
fraudulent transfer litigation under either the First Amendment or RFRA. It
did not decide whether the transfer from the Archdiocese to the Cemetery
Trust was avoidable, because that issue was not before it.267 As discussed
above, its narrow conclusion relied on fundamental misunderstandings of
bankruptcy law.268
When the question of whether the bankruptcy trustee is a governmental
actor has arisen in other contexts, courts have treated the trustee as a
government actor. For example, courts have consistently held that the
Barton doctrine protects bankruptcy trustees from suit in district court for
actions taken in exercise of their authority over property of the estate.269 The
Barton doctrine generally prohibits suit against a court-appointed receiver in
a federal district court without permission of the court who appointed him.270
The Seventh Circuit in In re Linton271 held that the Barton doctrine applies
to suits against a bankruptcy trustee because the trustee “is a statutory
successor to the equity receiver . . . working in effect for the court that
appointed or approved him, administering property that has come under the
court’s control by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code.”272 The Seventh Circuit
in Listecki did not consider its own precedent in In re Linton.
After the Seventh Circuit decided Listecki, the Third Circuit held, in In
re J & S Properties,273 without discussing Listecki, that a bankruptcy trustee
acting as agent for the estate is a governmental actor.274 The court considered
whether a bankruptcy trustee was entitled to qualified immunity from
266

Id.
Id. at 736.
268
See discussion supra Part IV.D.1–2.
269
See, e.g., Blixseth v. Brown (In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC), 841 F.3d 1090,
1094 (9th Cir. 2016); Muratore v. Darr, 375 F.3d 140, 147 (1st Cir. 2004); Carter v. Rodgers,
220 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 1998);
Lebovits v. Scheffel (In re Lehal Realty Assocs.), 101 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1996); Allard
v. Weitzman (In re Delorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240–41 (6th Cir. 1993).
270
Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 129 (1881) (stating that plaintiffs must obtain the
permission of the bankruptcy court before suing certain officers acting in their official
capacities).
271
136 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 1998).
272
Id. at 545.
273
Phoenician Mediterranean Villa, LLC v. Swope (In re J & S Props., LLC), 872 F.3d
138 (3d Cir. 2017).
274
Id. at 143.
267
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liability under § 1983 for actions taken as bankruptcy trustee to preserve
property of the estate.275 Applying the test for qualified immunity set forth
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,276 the Third Circuit held that the trustee was entitled
to immunity.277 Noting that a trustee has a duty to protect property of the
estate, account for it to the court, and perform other adjudicatory and
administrative functions, the court held that it was “clear that Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Trustees . . . are government officials.”278
Because the Seventh Circuit in Listecki determined that exercise of the
trustee’s avoiding powers was not action of the “government,” it did not
decide whether, if RFRA applied, the government’s interest in enforcing the
trustee’s avoiding powers against the Archbishop would be sufficiently
compelling to justify a substantial burden on free exercise of religion. Under
RFRA, courts must consider whether the government’s interest is
compelling with reference to the application of a specific law to the
“particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially
burdened.”279 The Supreme Court has held in cases construing RFRA that
whether a substantial burden is justified by a compelling governmental
interest turns on “a case-by-case determination of the question, sensitive to
the facts of each particular claim.”280 The compelling interest test under
RFRA is “not to be made in the abstract” but rather “in the circumstances of
[the] case.”281
The Seventh Circuit’s justification for its conclusion that the
government’s interest in enforcement of bankruptcy law was compelling for
275

After a dispute with a tenant, the trustee changed the locks on a building which was
the largest asset in the estate, ostensibly to preserve the asset from damage. Id. at 140–41.
The tenant sued the trustee for wrongful eviction and violation of its Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights under § 1983. Id. at 141–42.
276
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
277
In re J & S Props., LLC, 872 F.3d at 143.
278
Id.; see also Curry v. Castillo (In re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2002)
(noting that the bankruptcy trustee performs “both adjudicatory and administrative functions”
and is a congressionally-created “hybrid official”).
279
Gonzales v. Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–431
(2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2018)).
280
Id. at 431 (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at
42 U.S.C §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2018)), as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859
(2015)); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993) (stating that a compelling interest is one “of the highest order” and is found in “rare
cases”).
281
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584 (2000); see also Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 725 (2014) (stating that the government must demonstrate
that its “marginal interest in enforcing the [challenged law] in these cases” is compelling);
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 804 n.9 (2011) (“[T]he government does not
have a compelling interest in each marginal percentage point by which its goals are
advanced.”).
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First Amendment protection falls short of the individualized analysis the
Court has required under RFRA. The Seventh Circuit noted that ruling in
favor of the Archbishop would create a general free exercise of religion
exception to the Bankruptcy Code282 and a “logistical nightmare” for the
courts.283 It described a classic slippery slope: The court would have to
consider every section in the Bankruptcy Code, determine whether that
section substantially burdened a party’s religious beliefs, and then determine
whether the particular section furthered a compelling governmental
interest.284
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,285 a
RFRA case, the Supreme Court characterized this argument as “the classic
rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you,
I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.”286 The Court made
it clear in Gonzales that RFRA mandates that courts balance on a case-bycase basis the governmental interests in consistent enforcement of laws
against the imposition in that case on individuals’ religious liberty.287 It held
that under RFRA, exceptions from law enforcement to protect free exercise
of religion do not invariably open an unmanageable floodgate of requests for
exceptions or fatally undermine the government’s interest in enforcement.288
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s prediction of doom, the Supreme Court
in Gonzales expressed confidence that courts are capable of deciding in
individual cases when the balance tips in favor of protection of religious
282
Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 748 (7th Cir. 2015)
(“Such an exception would also open up a religious affirmative defense beyond this case to
all provisions of the Code, so long as that belief is sincerely held.”).
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
546 U.S. 418 (2006) (holding that government failed under RFRA to demonstrate a
compelling interest in enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) against a church
and its members who used a controlled substance in religious worship).
286
Id. at 436.
287
Id. at 430 (noting that “RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—
the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.”);
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (stating that
courts must use a case-by-case analysis to determine whether government’s interest in
uniform application of law is sufficiently compelling to justify a burden on free exercise of
religion under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, which
applies RFRA standards to federal and state prisoners’ requests for religious
accommodations); United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting slipperyslope reasoning in a case involving a religious group’s assertion of a Free Exercise clause
exception to the cannabis prohibitions in the CSA).
288
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 431–36; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 236
(1972) (recognizing a religious liberty exemption from generally applicable state compulsory
education laws for Amish children because the state failed to show an impediment to its
“paramount” interest in education by recognizing an exemption for the Amish).
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liberty.289
It remains to be seen how the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Listecki, and
the split it created with the Eighth Circuit’s holding in In re Young, will
influence the development of law governing religious liberty defenses to
bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy laws do not frequently conflict with religious
expression, and the specific circumstances of cases where they do will be
critically important. For example, compared to the tithes the Eighth Circuit
protected from fraudulent transfer avoidance in In re Young,290 the transfer
of $55 million to the Cemetery Trust appeared to be an intentional wealth
protective maneuver in anticipation of liability for sexual abuse claims, not
a routine act of religious expression. The Seventh Circuit’s holding in
Listecki, although broad in its conclusions, can be limited to its unusual
procedural posture and facts. Although its impact on the law governing
religious liberty may be limited, the Seventh Circuit’s decision resolved an
expensive legal issue in the case, shifted the leverage in favor of sexual abuse
claimants, and smoothed the way for settlement and confirmation of a
consensual plan of reorganization.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of bankruptcy proceedings by Catholic organizations as a
means to resolve mass tort liability for clergy sexual abuse has been
remarkably successful.291 For the Catholic diocesan debtors, the price of
bankruptcy relief has been intense public scrutiny of previously private
matters, including the external consequences of inter-hierarchical
relationships prescribed in canon law. The bankruptcy cases of Catholic
dioceses have made it clear that Catholic religious organizations are
significant economic actors in the secular world. Decisions made within the
Catholic hierarchy of authority under canon law for internal religious
purposes have profound external consequences, not only on creditors outside
the Church, but also on the faithful within it.

289

Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 436.
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, 1420 (8th
Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
291
See infra Appendix B: Outcomes of Cases.
290
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APPENDIX A: CASE INFORMATION

Name of Debtor
Archdiocese of
Portland
Diocese of
Tucson
Diocese of
Spokane
Diocese of
Davenport
Diocese of San
Diego
Diocese of
Fairbanks*
Oregon Province,
Society of Jesus
Diocese of
Wilmington
Archdiocese of
Milwaukee
Christian Brothers
of Ireland
Diocese of Gallup
Diocese of
Stockton
Diocese of Helena
Archdiocese of
St. Paul and
Minneapolis
Diocese of Duluth
Diocese of New
Ulm
Diocese of Great
Falls- Billings
Crosier Fathers
and Brothers

Date
Filed
07/06/
2004
09/20/
2004
12/06/
2004
10/10/
2006
02/27/
2007
03/01/
2008
02/17/
2009
10/18/
2009
01/04/
2011
04/28/
2011
11/12/
2013
01/15/
2014
01/31/
2014
01/16/
2015
12/07/
2015
03/03/
2017
03/31/
2017
06/01/
2017

Court
D. Oregon
D. Arizona
E.D.
Washington
S.D. Iowa
S.D. California
D. Alaska
D. Oregon
D. Delaware
E.D.
Wisconsin
S.D. New
York
D. New
Mexico
E.D. California
D. Montana
D. Minnesota
D. Minnesota
D. Minnesota
D. Montana
D. Minnesota

Docket
Number
3:04-bk37154
4:04-bk04721
2:04-bk08822
3:06-bk02229
3:07-bk00939
4:08-bk00110
3:09-bk30938
1:09-bk13560
2:11-bk20059
7:11-bk22820
1:13-bk13676
2:14-bk20371
2:14-bk60074
3:15-bk30125
5:15-bk50792
3:17-bk30601
2:17-bk60271
4:17-bk41681

Date
Confirmed
04/17/2007
08/01/2005
04/24/2007
05/01/2008
Settled 11/
16/2007
02/17/2010
07/29/2011
07/28/2011
11/13/2015
01/13/2014
06/23/2016
01/13/2017
03/05/2015
09/25/2018
Pending
Pending
08/22/2018
03/26/2018

Corporate
Form of
Debtor
Corporation
Sole
Corporation
Sole
Corporation
Sole
Non-Profit
Corp.
Corporation
Sole
Corporation
Sole
Non-Profit
Corp.
Non-Profit
Corp.
Non-Profit
Corp.
Non-Profit
Corp.
Corporation
Sole
Corporation
Sole
Corporation
Sole
Religious
Corp.***
Religious
Corp.***
Religious
Corp.***
Corporation
Sole
Non-Profit
Corp.

Separately
Incorporated
Parishes?
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No**
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

* The corporate name of the Diocese of Fairbanks is Catholic Bishop of
Northern Alaska, or CBNA, which is listed as the official name of the debtor
in all bankruptcy court filings.
** Oregon Province is comprised of Jesuit Communities, many of which are
not separately incorporated entities.
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*** St. Paul and Minneapolis, Duluth, and New Ulm are classified as
“Religious Diocesan Corporations” under relevant state statutory regimes
recognizing religious corporations.

APPENDIX B: OUTCOMES OF CASES
Amount in Millions

Type

Date
Filed

Date
Confirmed

Time Filing
to
Confirmation

Settlement
Total

Number
of
Victims

Settlement
Per Victim

Portland

Archdiocese

07/06
/2004

04/17/2007

2.78 Years

$74.4

$52.0

$19.1

173

$430,000

Tucson

Diocese

09/20
/2004

08/01/2005

0.86 Years

$22.2

Diocese

12/06
/2004

$14.8

$5.0

45

$493,300

04/24/2007

2.38 Years

Davenport

Diocese

10/10
/2006

$48.0

$20.0

$10.9

150

$320,000

05/01/2008

1.56 Years

$37.0

$19.5

$2.6

162

$228,390

San Diego
*

Diocese

02/27
/2007

11/16/2007

0.72 Years

$198.1

$75.65

$5.0

144

$1,375,690

Fairbanks
**

Diocese

Oregon
Province
Society of
Jesus

03/01
/2008

02/17/2010

1.97 Years

$9.8

$1.4

$4.8

290

$33,790

Religious
Order

02/17
/2009

07/29/2011

2.44 Years

$166.1

$118.0

$8.6

535

$310,460

Wilmington

Diocese

10/18
/2009

07/28/2011

1.78 Years

$77.4

$15.6

$15.8

148

$522,970

Milwaukee

Archdiocese

01/04
/2011

11/13/2015

4.86 Years

$21.0

$10.7

$23.0

350

$60,000

Christian
Bros. of
Ireland

Religious
Order

04/28
/2011

01/13/2014

2.72 Years

$16.5

$3.5

$8.1

400

$41,000

Gallup

Diocese

11/12
/2013

06/23/2016

2.62 Years

$22.0

$18.9

$3.5

57

$385,960

Stockton

Diocese

01/15
/2014

01/13/2017

3.00 Years

$17.1

$3.3

$1.0

30

$570,000

Helena

Diocese

01/31
/2014

03/05/2015

1.09 Years

$21.0

$14.4

$2.0

360

$58,000

St. Paul and
Minneapolis

Archdiocese

01/16
/2015

09/25/2018

3.69 Years

$210.3

$166.8

$26.0

450

$467,300

Great FallsBillings

Diocese

03/31
/2017

08/22/2018

1.39 Years

$20.0

$8.0

$1.5

86

$232,560

Crosier
Fathers and
Brothers

Religious
Order

06/01
/2017

03/26/2018

0.82 Years

$25.5

$19.8

$1.1

43

$593,020

Duluth

Diocese

12/07
/2015

Pending

New Ulm

Diocese

03/03
/2017

Pending

Name of Case

Spokane

Total:

$986.4

Insurance
Portion

$562.4

Total
Prof’l
Fees

$138.0

3,423

Average of
$288,168
per victim
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* San Diego was settled and subsequently dismissed by the bankruptcy court
on November 16, 2007.
** The corporate name of the Diocese of Fairbanks is Catholic Bishop of
Northern Alaska, or CBNA.

